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Information Asymmetries in Cherry Markets

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Listed:
  • Rosenman, Robert E.
  • Wilson, Wesley W.

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Rosenman, Robert E. & Wilson, Wesley W., 1989. "Information Asymmetries in Cherry Markets," WAEA/ WFEA Conference Archive (1929-1995) 244907, Western Agricultural Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:waeaar:244907
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.244907
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bond, Eric W, 1982. "A Direct Test of the "Lemons" Model: The Market for Used Pickup Trucks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 836-840, September.
    2. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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