IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/revind/v36y2010i1p1-16.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

More Information, More Ripoffs: Experiments with Public and Private Information in Markets with Asymmetric Information

Author

Listed:
  • Bart Wilson
  • Arthur Zillante

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Bart Wilson & Arthur Zillante, 2010. "More Information, More Ripoffs: Experiments with Public and Private Information in Markets with Asymmetric Information," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 36(1), pages 1-16, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:36:y:2010:i:1:p:1-16
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-010-9240-1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11151-010-9240-1
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11151-010-9240-1?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Forsythe, Robert & Lundholm, Russell & Rietz, Thomas, 1999. "Cheap Talk, Fraud, and Adverse Selection in Financial Markets: Some Experimental Evidence," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(3), pages 481-518.
    2. Samuelson, William F, 1984. "Bargaining under Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 995-1005, July.
    3. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Levin, Jonathan, 2001. "Information and the Market for Lemons," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 657-666, Winter.
    5. Cason, Timothy N. & Friedman, Daniel & Milam, Garrett H., 2003. "Bargaining versus posted price competition in customer markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 223-251, February.
    6. Holt, Charles A & Sherman, Roger, 1990. "Advertising and Product Quality in Posted-Offer Experiments," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(1), pages 39-56, January.
    7. Sanjeev Dewan & Vernon Hsu, 2004. "Adverse Selection In Electronic Markets: Evidence From Online Stamp Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(4), pages 497-516, December.
    8. Kessler, Anke S, 2001. "Revisiting the Lemons Market," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(1), pages 25-41, February.
    9. Bond, Eric W, 1982. "A Direct Test of the "Lemons" Model: The Market for Used Pickup Trucks," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 836-840, September.
    10. Timothy N. Cason & Charles R. Plott, 2005. "Forced Information Disclosure and the Fallacy of Transparency in Markets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(4), pages 699-714, October.
    11. Miller, Ross M & Plott, Charles R, 1985. "Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 837-872, July.
    12. Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata, 2002. "Environmental Labeling and Incomplete Consumer Information in Laboratory Markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 113-134, January.
    13. Vernon L. Smith, 1962. "An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70(2), pages 111-111.
    14. Milam, Garrett, 2006. "A laboratory study of haggling with deadlines," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 505-520, May.
    15. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    16. Davis Douglas D. & Holt Charles A., 1994. "Equilibrium Cooperation in Three-Person, Choice-of-Partner Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 39-53, July.
    17. Rosenman, Robert E & Wilson, Wesley W, 1991. "Quality Differentials and Prices: Are Cherries Lemons?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(6), pages 649-658, December.
    18. George J. Mailath & Andrew Postlewaite, 1990. "Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(3), pages 351-367.
    19. R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, 1956. "The General Theory of Second Best," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 24(1), pages 11-32.
    20. Brian Chezum & Bradley S. Wimmer, 2000. "Evidence of Adverse Selection from Thoroughbred Wagering," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 66(3), pages 700-714, January.
    21. Kennan, John & Wilson, Robert, 1993. "Bargaining with Private Information," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 45-104, March.
    22. Vijay Krishna & Roberto Serrano, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80.
    23. Charles Wilson, 1980. "The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 108-130, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Martin POLÍVKA & David MARTINČÍK, 2014. "Measures ensuring the food quality on retail markets: experimental perspective," Agricultural Economics, Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences, vol. 60(8), pages 343-352.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fabrice Etilé & Sabrina Teyssier, 2012. "Signaling Corporate Social Responsibility: Third-Party Certification vs. Brands," PSE Working Papers halshs-00736551, HAL.
    2. Dariel, Aurelie & Riedl, Arno & Siegenthaler, Simon, 2021. "Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 109-130.
    3. Siegenthaler, Simon, 2017. "Meet the lemons: An experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 147-161.
    4. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00736551 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Glenn Furton & Adam Martin, 2019. "Beyond market failure and government failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 197-216, January.
    6. Adriani, Fabrizio & Deidda, Luca G., 2009. "Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 335-350, November.
    7. Carroll, Gabriel, 2016. "Informationally robust trade and limits to contagion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 334-361.
    8. Jonathan R. Peterson & Henry S. Schneider, 2017. "Beautiful Lemons: Adverse Selection in Durable-Goods Markets with Sorting," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(9), pages 3111-3127, September.
    9. Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie Villeval, 2011. "Hidden information, bargaining power, and efficiency: an experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(2), pages 133-159, May.
    10. Fabian Herweg & Daniel Müller, 2016. "Overconfidence in the Markets for Lemons," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 118(2), pages 354-371, April.
    11. Martin POLÍVKA & David MARTINČÍK, 2014. "Measures ensuring the food quality on retail markets: experimental perspective," Agricultural Economics, Czech Academy of Agricultural Sciences, vol. 60(8), pages 343-352.
    12. Giorgio Coricelli & Luigi Luini, 1999. "Double Moral Hazard: an Experiment on Warranties," CEEL Working Papers 9901, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    13. Fernandes, Maria Eduarda & Valente, Marieta, 2021. "What you get is not what you paid for: New evidence from a lab experiment on negative externalities and information asymmetries," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    14. Dionne, Georges, 1998. "La mesure empirique des problèmes d’information," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 74(4), pages 585-606, décembre.
    15. Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2006. "Competition, hidden information, and efficiency : an experiment," UC3M Working papers. Economics we071909, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    16. Bilancini, Ennio & Boncinelli, Leonardo, 2016. "Dynamic adverse selection and the supply size," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 233-242.
    17. Ingrid Bauer & Liudmila Zavolokina & Gerhard Schwabe, 2020. "Is there a market for trusted car data?," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 30(2), pages 211-225, June.
    18. Belleflamme, Paul & Peitz, Martin, 2014. "Asymmetric information and overinvestment in quality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 127-143.
    19. Schmitz, Patrick W. & Sliwka, Dirk, 1998. "Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern," MPRA Paper 6941, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Fischer, Justina A.V., 2012. "The choice of domestic policies in a globalized economy: Extended Version," MPRA Paper 37816, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. Pablo Kurlat, 2018. "Liquidity as Social Expertise," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 73(2), pages 619-656, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric information; Laboratory experiment; Lemons market; Posted-offer; Two-sided multilateral negotiations; D82; C91;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:36:y:2010:i:1:p:1-16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.