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Competition Among Rent Seeking Groups in General Equilibrium

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  • Roe, Terry L.
  • Graham-Tomasi, Theodore

Abstract

A two sector general equilibrium model is developed in which households can influence the government's choice of the relative price of traded goods and the level of public goods supplied to each sector. The model is used to illustrate key problems addressed by the political economy literature, modeling issues that arise, and the nature of insights that can be obtained that traditional approaches cannot discern.

Suggested Citation

  • Roe, Terry L. & Graham-Tomasi, Theodore, 1990. "Competition Among Rent Seeking Groups in General Equilibrium," Bulletins 7483, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:umedbu:7483
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.7483
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Romer, Paul M, 1986. "Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(5), pages 1002-1037, October.
    2. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 2008. "Seeking Rents by Setting Rents: The Political Economy of Rent Seeking," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 555-569, Springer.
    3. Peltzman, Sam, 1985. "An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 656-675, September.
    4. Bhagwati, Jagdish N, 1982. "Directly Unproductive, Profit-seeking (DUP) Activities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 988-1002, October.
    5. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    6. Roe, Terry L. & Yeldan, A. Erinc, 1988. "An Open Economy Model of Political Influence and Competition Among Rent Seeking Groups," Bulletins 7499, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
    7. Magee,Stephen P. & Brock,William A. & Young,Leslie, 1989. "Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521377003, November.
    8. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1986. "Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 175-181, January.
    9. Goldstein, Judith, 1988. "Ideas, institutions, and American trade policy," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(1), pages 179-217, January.
    10. Marschak, Thomas A., 2005. "Organization design," Handbook of Mathematical Economics, in: K. J. Arrow & M.D. Intriligator (ed.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, edition 2, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1359-1440, Elsevier.
    11. Bhagwati, Jagdish N & Srinivasan, T N, 1980. "Revenue Seeking: A Generalization of the Theory of Tariffs," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(6), pages 1069-1087, December.
    12. Prescott, Edward C & Boyd, John H, 1987. "Dynamic Coalitions: Engines of Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 63-67, May.
    13. Ronald Findlay & Stanislaw Wellisz, 1982. "Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 223-244, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    15. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1988. "On the mechanics of economic development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-42, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1986. "Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 175-181, January.
    2. Kinsey, Jean D. & Houck, James P., 1990. "The Growing Demand for Food Quality: Implications for International Trade," 1990: The Environment, Government Policies, and International Trade Meeting, December 1990, San Diego, CA 50877, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
    3. Chen, Kai-Lih & Graham-Tomasi, Ted & Roe, Terry, 1993. "Political Economy and Pollution Regulation: Instrument Choice in a Lobbying Economy," Staff Paper Series 201174, Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural, Food, and Resource Economics.

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