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Time-Consistent Policies

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  • Karp, Larry S.
  • Lee, In Ho

Abstract

In many cases the optimal open-loop policy to influence agents who solve dynamic problems is time-inconsistent. We show how to construct a time-consistent open-loop policy rule. We also consider an additional restriction under which the time-consistent open-loop policy is stationary. We use examples to illustrate the properties of these tax rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Karp, Larry S. & Lee, In Ho, 2000. "Time-Consistent Policies," CUDARE Working Papers 6275, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:ucbecw:6275
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.6275
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Chu, Angus C., 2009. "A politico-economic analysis of the European Union's R&D policy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 582-590, December.
    2. Luca Lambertini, 2014. "Exploration For Nonrenewable Resources In A Dynamic Oligopoly: An Arrovian Result," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(02), pages 1-11.
    3. George E. Halkos & George J. Papageorgiou, 2012. "Pollution Control Policy: A Dynamic Taxation Scheme," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 14-37, March.
    4. Larry Karp & Jiangfeng Zhang, 2016. "Taxes Versus Quantities for a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Abatement Costs and Asymmetric Information," Studies in Economic Theory, in: Graciela Chichilnisky & Armon Rezai (ed.), The Economics of the Global Environment, pages 493-533, Springer.
    5. Chu, Angus C., 2011. "The welfare cost of one-size-fits-all patent protection," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 876-890, June.
    6. Cellini, Roberto & Lambertini, Luca, 2007. "Time consistent fiscal policies in a Ramsey economy," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 296-313, May.
    7. Miguel González-Maestre & Diego Peñarrubia, 2005. "Innovation, merger policy and technology transfer," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(1), pages 181-201, January.
    8. R. Cellini & L. Lambertini & G. Leitmann, 2004. "Perfect Uncontrollable Differential Games," Working Papers 509, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    9. Baldini, Massimo & Lambertini, Luca, 2011. "Profit taxation and capital accumulation in a dynamic oligopoly model," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 13-18, January.
    10. Chu, Angus C. & Yang, C.C., 2012. "Fiscal centralization versus decentralization: Growth and welfare effects of spillovers, Leviathan taxation, and capital mobility," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 177-188.
    11. Penyalver, Domingo & Turró, Mateu & Zavala-Rojas, Diana, 2018. "Intergenerational perception of the utility of major transport projects," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 97-111.
    12. Chakraborty, Bidisha & Gupta, Manash Ranjan, 2009. "Human capital, inequality, endogenous growth and educational subsidy: A theoretical analysis," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 77-90, June.
    13. Christos Koulovatianos & Leonard J. Mirman, 2005. "Endogenous Public Policy and Long-Run Growth: Some Simple Analytics," Vienna Economics Papers 0502, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
    14. Christos Koulovatianos & Leonard J. Mirman, 2004. "Endogenous Public Policy and Long-Run Growth," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 2-2004, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.

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