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The Evaluation of Thailand’s Preferential Trading Arrangements with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, China, and India – The CGE Approach

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  • Lochindaratn, Pachara

Abstract

This paper performs the impact analysis of certain bilateral preferential trading agreements Thailand has reached with Japan, China, India, Australia, and New Zealand. Accordingly, the model utilises the GTAP 6.0 database while explicitly determining the degree of commodity market competition by sector; and labour market paradigm by skill level, in order to better reflect economic reality. Among Thai bilateral FTAs entered into force thus far, in terms of EV, JTEPA is the most while TNZCEPA turns out to be the least beneficial FTA for Thailand. Still, real gains from bilateral FTAs are trivial compared to the benefits from the groupings that include ASEAN as a whole; and unilateral trade liberalisation boosts the economy of Thailand almost as much as global free trade. On the whole, trade diversion is offset by trade creation, thus the world economy finds all of the Thailand’s FTAs welfare improving, albeit extremely marginal.

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  • Lochindaratn, Pachara, 2008. "The Evaluation of Thailand’s Preferential Trading Arrangements with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, China, and India – The CGE Approach," Conference papers 331786, Purdue University, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Global Trade Analysis Project.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:pugtwp:331786
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    1. Joseph E. Aldy & Scott Barrett & Robert N. Stavins, 2003. "Thirteen plus one: a comparison of global climate policy architectures," Climate Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(4), pages 373-397, December.
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