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Agriculture'S Shifting Political Power Base

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  • Cole, Christine A.
  • Featherstone, Allen M.

Abstract

This study examines the change over time in agricultural congressional market power and production concentration using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and concentration ratios. Results indicate that the number of congressional districts representing the production of several crops has declined substantially and that greater concentration within crop and livestock variables has occurred.

Suggested Citation

  • Cole, Christine A. & Featherstone, Allen M., 1999. "Agriculture'S Shifting Political Power Base," 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN 21554, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea99:21554
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.21554
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bruce L. Gardner, 1989. "Economic Theory and Farm Politics," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 71(5), pages 1165-1171.
    2. Bender, Bruce & Lott, John R, Jr, 1996. "Legislator Voting and Shirking: A Critical Review of the Literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 67-100, April.
    3. Paarlberg, Robert, 1989. "THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURAL POLICY: Three Approaches," 1989 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 2, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 270661, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    4. David S. Bullock, 1994. "In Search of Rational Government: What Political Preference Function Studies Measure and Assume," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 76(3), pages 347-361.
    5. Robert Paarlberg, 1989. "The Political Economy of American Agricultural Policy: Three Approaches," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 71(5), pages 1157-1164.
    6. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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