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Trade Liberalization And International Merger In Cournot Industries: The Case Of Barley Malting In North America

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  • Buschena, David E.
  • Gray, Richard S.

Abstract

When free trade merges formally distinct non-competitive industries, welfare should increase. Additional incentives for mergers may reduce these gains from free trade. We show the importance of such arguments in an analysis of the malting barley industry in North America before and after the Canadian/U.S. free trade agreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Buschena, David E. & Gray, Richard S., 1998. "Trade Liberalization And International Merger In Cournot Industries: The Case Of Barley Malting In North America," 1998 Annual meeting, August 2-5, Salt Lake City, UT 20950, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea98:20950
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20950
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    References listed on IDEAS

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