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Balancing Act: Economic Incentives, Administrative Restrictions, And Urban Land Expansion In China

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  • Feng, Juan
  • Lichtenberg, Erik
  • Ding, Chengri

Abstract

We examine how the system of “federalism, Chinese style” functions in the context of land allocation. China’s land laws give provision of land a central role in local officials’ growth promotion strategies. Requisitions of farmland by local authorities have engendered significant rural unrest. In response, the central government has attempted to re-establish control over the pace of urban land expansion by enacting regulations limiting conversion of rural land to urban uses. We derive theoretically the conditions under which non-compliance with such regulations is optimal. An econometric investigation shows that legal restrictions on farmland conversion had no effect on rates of farmland loss but did limit urban spatial growth rates in some regions. Our econometric evidence suggests very limited enforcement of those legal limits on farmland conversion.

Suggested Citation

  • Feng, Juan & Lichtenberg, Erik & Ding, Chengri, 2013. "Balancing Act: Economic Incentives, Administrative Restrictions, And Urban Land Expansion In China," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 149669, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea13:149669
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.149669
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    Cited by:

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    3. Zhi Wang & Qinghua Zhang & Li-An Zhou, 2020. "Career Incentives of City Leaders and Urban Spatial Expansion in China," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 102(5), pages 897-911, December.
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    5. Bao, Helen X.H. & Wang, Ziyou & Wu, Robert Liangqi, 2024. "Understanding local government debt financing of infrastructure projects in China: Evidence based on accounting data from local government financing vehicles," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 136(C).
    6. Rong Wu & Yongli Zhang & Meilin Dai & Qingyin Li & Changlong Sun, 2023. "The Heterogeneity of the Drivers of Urban Form in China: Perspectives from Regional Disparities and Development Stage Variations," Land, MDPI, vol. 12(7), pages 1-20, July.
    7. Zhanzhong Tang & Zengxiang Zhang & Lijun Zuo & Xiao Wang & Shunguang Hu & Zijuan Zhu, 2020. "Spatial Econometric Analysis of the Relationship between Urban Land and Regional Economic Development in the Beijing–Tianjin–Hebei Coordinated Development Region," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(20), pages 1-21, October.
    8. Bai, Caiquan & Xie, Dongshui & Zhang, Yuwei, 2024. "Industrial land transfer and enterprise pollution emissions: Evidence from China," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 181-194.
    9. Wang, Jian & Wu, Qun & Yan, Siqi & Guo, Guancheng & Peng, Shangui, 2020. "China’s local governments breaking the land use planning quota: A strategic interaction perspective," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 92(C).
    10. Wenzhang Zhou & Haijun Bao, 2021. "What Limits the Benefits of Land-Lost Farmers in Chinese Courts? An Investigation of Chinese Land Acquisition and Resettlement Cases in the Yangtze River Delta," SAGE Open, , vol. 11(3), pages 21582440211, September.
    11. Hui Li & Kunqiu Chen & Lei Yan & Yulin Zhu & Liuwen Liao & Yangle Chen, 2021. "Urban Land Use Transitions and the Economic Spatial Spillovers of Central Cities in China’s Urban Agglomerations," Land, MDPI, vol. 10(6), pages 1-27, June.
    12. Tang, Peng & Feng, Yue & Li, Min & Zhang, Yanyan, 2021. "Can the performance evaluation change from central government suppress illegal land use in local governments? A new interpretation of Chinese decentralisation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    13. Yunfei Peng & Jing Qian & Fu Ren & Wenhui Zhang & Qingyun Du, 2016. "Sustainability of Land Use Promoted by Construction-to-Ecological Land Conversion: A Case Study of Shenzhen City, China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 8(7), pages 1-16, July.
    14. Liping Shan & Chuyi Zhang & Tianxiao Zhou & Yuzhe Wu & Liang Zhang & Jiaming Shan, 2024. "Fixability–Flexibility Relations in Sustainable Territorial Spatial Planning in China: A Review from the Food–Energy–Water Nexus Perspective," Land, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-20, February.
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    16. Cheng, Jian & Zhao, Jiangmeng & Liu, Dandan, 2024. "Incentive adjustments and land leasing behavior shifts: A quasi-natural experiment of off-office audits," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Community/Rural/Urban Development; International Development; Land Economics/Use; Public Economics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • P35 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Public Finance
    • O18 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment

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