Statutory Rewards to Environmental Self-Auditing: Do They Reduce Pollution and Save Regulatory Costs? Evidence from a Cross-State Panel
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DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.6204
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Keywords
Environmental Economics and Policy;NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ENV-2008-11-18 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2008-11-18 (Regulation)
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