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Rationed Access And Welfare: Case Of Public Resource Lotteries

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  • Scrogin, David
  • Berrens, Robert P.

Abstract

Pressures on natural resource stocks and habitats on public lands and waterways are resulting increasingly in the rationing of public access by lottery. Upon accounting for the uncertainties of random rationing, discrete choice models lend themselves to analyzing participation in public resource lotteries and estimating welfare changes. Key to the modeling is the estimation of individual-specific expected access-probabilities. In the application we model the discrete choices of more than 18,000 participants in a lottery system for harvest rights. Welfare estimates are obtained from simulated policy changes affecting individually and jointly the access probability and indirect utility.

Suggested Citation

  • Scrogin, David & Berrens, Robert P., 2001. "Rationed Access And Welfare: Case Of Public Resource Lotteries," 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL 20472, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea01:20472
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20472
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    1. Yoder, Jonathan K. & Ohler, Adrienne M. & Chouinard, Hayley H., 2014. "What floats your boat? Preference revelation from lotteries over complex goods," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 412-430.
    2. Condorelli, Daniele, 2013. "Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 582-591.
    3. Sebastián D. Bauer, 2023. "Buyers’ welfare maximizing auction design," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 555-567, June.
    4. Phaneuf, Daniel J. & Smith, V. Kerry, 2006. "Recreation Demand Models," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 671-761, Elsevier.
    5. Nguyen, To N. & Shaw, W. Douglass & Woodward, Richard T. & Paterson, Robert & Boyle, Kevin, 2007. "An empirical study of option prices for hunting permits," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2-3), pages 476-484, August.
    6. Roberts, David C. & Boyer, Tracy A. & Lusk, Jayson L., 2008. "Preferences for environmental quality under uncertainty," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(4), pages 584-593, July.
    7. Reeling, Carson & Verdier, Valentin & Lupi, Frank, 2016. "Valuing Natural Resources Allocated by Dynamic Lottery," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts 235673, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public Economics;

    JEL classification:

    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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