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Unusual electoral systems and political hegemony. Evidence from the argentine subnational districts

Author

Listed:
  • José J. Bercoff
  • Osvaldo Meloni
  • Juan Manuel Tabuenca

Abstract

A few years after the democracy was restored in 1983, Argentina has witnessed one of the most intense periods of political reforms with the proclaimed objective of modernizing the electoral system and extended political rights to province’s constituencies. Reforms included various critical items such as modifications in the electoral system which ended up changing the political game. This paper provides empirical evidence on the role played by the Double Simultaneous Voting System (DSVS), that performs simultaneously primaries and general elections, and its variations, grouped under the heading of Apparentment lists (ALs), that includes the so –called “Colectoras”, “Acoples” and “Adhesiones”, on the political competition of subnational districts for the period 1987 – 2015. DSVS was in force in 14.5% of the gubernatorial, 20.6% of the legislative and 23.8% of the mayoral elections. Likewise, the ALs were used in 33.9% of local legislative elections. Results from a panel data of eight gubernatorial elections and all 24 subnational jurisdictions show that DSVS and ALs diminish the effective number of parties, increase the margin of victory of the incumbent party and diminish the probability of party alternation and improve the probability of reelection of the incumbent governor.

Suggested Citation

  • José J. Bercoff & Osvaldo Meloni & Juan Manuel Tabuenca, 2020. "Unusual electoral systems and political hegemony. Evidence from the argentine subnational districts," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4375, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
  • Handle: RePEc:aep:anales:4375
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mariano Tommasi & Mark P. Jones & Pablo Sanguinetti, 1997. "Politics, Institutions, and Fiscal Performance in the Argentine Provinces," Working Papers 16, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Apr 2000.
    2. David Roodman, 2009. "A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 71(1), pages 135-158, February.
    3. Jones, Mark P. & Sanguinetti, Pablo & Tommasi, Mariano, 2000. "Politics, institutions, and fiscal performance in a federal system: an analysis of the Argentine provinces," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 305-333, April.
    4. Osvaldo Meloni, 2016. "Electoral opportunism and vertical fiscal imbalance," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 19, pages 145-168, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political competition; electoral systems; subnational politics; Argentina;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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