Unusual electoral systems and political hegemony. Evidence from the argentine subnational districts
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More about this item
Keywords
Political competition; electoral systems; subnational politics; Argentina;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CDM-2021-04-26 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2021-04-26 (Positive Political Economics)
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