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A Point Decision For Partially Identified Auction Models

Author

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  • Gaurab Aryal
  • Dong-Hyuk Kim

Abstract

This paper proposes a decision theoretic method to choose a single reserve price for partially identified auction models, such as Haile and Tamer, 2003, using data on transaction prices from English auctions. The paper employs Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989 for inference that is robust with respect to the prior over unidentified parameters. It is optimal to interpret the transaction price as the highest value, and maximize the posterior mean of the seller’s revenue. The Monte Carlo study shows substantial gains relative to the average revenues of the Haile and Tamer interval.

Suggested Citation

  • Gaurab Aryal & Dong-Hyuk Kim, 2012. "A Point Decision For Partially Identified Auction Models," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2012-569, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2012-569
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    File URL: https://www.cbe.anu.edu.au/researchpapers/econ/wp569.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Aaron Bodoh-Creed & Brent Hickman & John List & Ian Muir & Gregory Sun, 2023. "Stress Testing Structural Models of Unobserved Heterogeneity: Robust Inference on Optimal Nonlinear Pricing," Natural Field Experiments 00776, The Field Experiments Website.
    2. Grundl, Serafin & Zhu, Yu, 2023. "Robust inference in first-price auctions: Overbidding as an identifying restriction," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 235(2), pages 484-506.
    3. Nathan Canen & Kyungchul Song, 2021. "Counterfactual analysis under partial identification using locally robust refinement," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(4), pages 416-436, June.
    4. Larry G Epstein & Yoram Halevy, 2019. "Ambiguous Correlation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(2), pages 668-693.
    5. Epstein, Larry G. & Halevy, Yoram, 2014. "No Two Experiments are Identical," Microeconomics.ca working papers yoram_halevy-2014-9, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 15 Feb 2017.
    6. Kim, Dong-Hyuk & Ratan, Anmol, 2022. "Disentangling risk aversion and loss aversion in first-price auctions: An empirical approach," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
    7. Jun, Sung Jae & Pinkse, Joris, 2024. "An information–Theoretic approach to partially identified auction models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 238(2).
    8. Gaurab Aryal & Hanna Charankevich & Seungwon Jeong & Dong-Hyuk Kim, 2023. "Procurements with Bidder Asymmetry in Cost and Risk-Aversion," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(4), pages 1143-1156, October.
    9. Gaurab Aryal & Hanna Charankevich & Seungwon Jeong & Dong-Hyuk Kim, 2023. "Procurements with Bidder Asymmetry in Cost and Risk-Aversion," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(4), pages 1143-1156, October.
    10. Serafin J. Grundl & Yu Zhu, 2019. "Robust Inference in First-Price Auctions : Experimental Findings as Identifying Restrictions," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2019-006, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    11. Kim, Dong-Hyuk, 2013. "Optimal choice of a reserve price under uncertainty," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 587-602.
    12. Gaurab Aryal & Dong-Hyuk Kim, 2013. "Emprical Relevance of Ambiguity in First Price Auction Models," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2013-607, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    13. Aryal, Gaurab & Grundl, Serafin & Kim, Dong-Hyuk & Zhu, Yu, 2018. "Empirical relevance of ambiguity in first-price auctions," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 204(2), pages 189-206.
    14. Epstein, Larry G. & Seo, Kyoungwon, 2014. "De Finetti meets Ellsberg," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 11-26.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C11 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Bayesian Analysis: General
    • C44 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods: Special Topics - - - Operations Research; Statistical Decision Theory
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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