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The Economic Theory of Rights

In: The Economic Foundations of Government

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  • Randall G. Holcombe

    (Florida State University)

Abstract

A right is a claim by a specific individual, which is honored by other individuals, that some specific treatment is due him.1 How is an individual able to make such a claim, and why are others willing to honor it? The answers to both of these questions are the same. An individual will claim a right because he believes that having the right will make him better off. Likewise, others will honor the claim because they believe they are better off honoring the claim than not honoring it. The first step in developing a theory of rights is the recognition of the fact that people honor the rights of others because those honoring the rights believe it is in their self-interest to do so.

Suggested Citation

  • Randall G. Holcombe, 1994. "The Economic Theory of Rights," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: The Economic Foundations of Government, chapter 2, pages 11-31, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-13230-0_2
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-13230-0_2
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Randall G. Holcombe, 1994. "The Economic Foundations of Government," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-13230-0, October.
    2. Randall Holcombe, 2008. "Why does government produce national defense?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 11-19, October.
    3. Leland B. Yeager, 1985. "Rights, Contract, and Utility in Policy Espousal," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 5(1), pages 259-294, Spring/Su.
    4. repec:wvu:wpaper:09-09 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. North,Douglass C. & Wallis,John Joseph & Weingast,Barry R., 2013. "Violence and Social Orders," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107646995, September.
    6. Russell S. Sobel & Brian J. Osoba, 2009. "Youth Gangs as Pseudo-Governments Implications for Violent Crime," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(4), pages 996-1018, April.
    7. Peter T. Leeson, 2007. "An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1049-1094, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dagdeviren, Hulya & Elangovan, Arthanari & Parimalavelli, Ramanathan, 2023. "Land tenure and food security in South India," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 132(C).
    2. repec:wvu:wpaper:09-09 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Turan Yay & Gülsün G. Yay & Tolga Aksoy, 2018. "Impact of institutions on entrepreneurship: a panel data analysis," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 8(1), pages 131-160, April.
    4. Cai, Meina & Murtazashvili, Ilia & Murtazashvili, Jennifer, 2020. "The politics of land property rights," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 151-167, April.
    5. Ilia Murtazashvili & Jennifer Murtazashvili, 2019. "The political economy of legal titling," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(3), pages 251-268, September.
    6. Plinio Limata, 2020. "Blockchain and Institutions (II): The Realm of Law," CERBE Working Papers wpC36, CERBE Center for Relationship Banking and Economics.

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