IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/pal/intecp/978-1-349-25849-9_9.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation Problems

In: Social Choice Re-examined

Author

Listed:
  • Hervé Moulin

    (Duke University)

  • William Thomson

    (University of Rochester)

Abstract

Fair division is as old as mathematics. According to the Roman historian Proclus, the litigious division of land after the yearly flood of the Nile triggered the invention of geometry by the Egyptians, and the necessities of trade and commerce that of arithmetic by the Phoenicians (see Guilbaud, 1952). The modern literature on fair allocation is however very new. Its origin can be traced back to three seminal papers: on the one hand, Nash’s (1950) paper on the bargaining problem and Shapley’s (1953) paper on coalitional form games; on the other hand, Foley’s (1967) essay introducing the no-envy test for the distribution of unproduced resources.

Suggested Citation

  • Hervé Moulin & William Thomson, 1997. "Axiomatic Analysis of Resource Allocation Problems," International Economic Association Series, in: Kenneth J. Arrow & Amartya Sen & Kotaro Suzumura (ed.), Social Choice Re-examined, chapter 5, pages 101-120, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-25849-9_9
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-25849-9_9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Le Breton, Michel & Weymark, John A., 2002. "Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains," IDEI Working Papers 143, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Sep 2003.
    2. Fleurbaey, Marc & Maniquet, François, 2017. "Fairness and well-being measurement," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 119-126.
    3. Maniquet, François, 2008. "Social orderings for the assignment of indivisible objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 199-215, November.
    4. Marc Fleurbaey & Stéphane Luchini & Erik Schokkaert & Carine Van de Voorde, 2012. "Évaluation des politiques de santé : pour une prise en compte équitable des intérêts des populations," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 455(1), pages 11-36.
    5. M. Fleurbaey & F. Maniquet, 2008. "Fair social orderings," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(1), pages 25-45, January.
    6. Kaminski, Marek M., 2004. "Social choice and information: the informational structure of uniqueness theorems in axiomatic social theories," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 121-138, September.
    7. Schauf, Andrew & Oh, Poong, 2021. "Myopic reallocation of extraction improves collective outcomes in networked common-pool resource games," SocArXiv w2cxp, Center for Open Science.
    8. Marc Fleurbaey, 2002. "Retraites, générations et catégories sociales : de l'équité comme contrainte à l'équité comme objectif," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 68(4), pages 91-111.
    9. Yukihiro Nishimura, 2008. "Envy Minimization In The Optimal Tax Context," Working Paper 1178, Economics Department, Queen's University.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-25849-9_9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.palgrave.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.