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Public Policy: Object of Choice or Emergent Phenomena? Learning from the Implementation of the Medical Reimbursement Act in Poland

In: Entangled Political Economy

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  • Marta Podemska-Mikluch

Abstract

The recurring implementation and continuous maintenance of price controls implies a deep incongruence between public policy and economic common sense. Yet, economists do not tire of concluding their papers with policy recommendations as if oblivious to the ineffectiveness of their efforts. By assuming that policy is an object of choice, economists have no alternative but to naively hope for a decision-maker sensitive to economic logic. An alternative approach is to think of policy, not as an object of choice but as an outcome of a competitive process. From this perspective, the often-lamented disregard for economic principles is not a characteristic of a deficient policymaker, but a systemic quality of institutional arrangements. I illustrate my argument with the analysis of the implementation of rigid prices for reimbursed pharmaceuticals in Poland.

Suggested Citation

  • Marta Podemska-Mikluch, 2014. "Public Policy: Object of Choice or Emergent Phenomena? Learning from the Implementation of the Medical Reimbursement Act in Poland," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: Entangled Political Economy, volume 18, pages 93-110, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:aaeczz:s1529-213420140000018005
    DOI: 10.1108/S1529-213420140000018005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Meg Patrick & Richard Wagner, 2015. "From mixed economy to entangled political economy: a Paretian social-theoretic orientation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 103-116, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Entangled political economy; healthcare; price controls: centralized mindset; B41; D78; D85; P16;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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