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Institutional impact on the expropriation of private benefits of control in North Africa

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  • Hearn, Bruce

Abstract

This paper examines the effectiveness of six institutional quality measures, namely corruption control, effective government, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law and voice and accountability, in inhibiting self-rewarding behaviour of boards in terms of their compensation as well as in influencing the likelihood of disclosure of individual executive salaries in IPO listings prospectuses. Using a unique and comprehensive dataset of 78 hand-collected IPO firms from across North Africa from 2000 to 2012 I find substantial evidence that government effectiveness and corruption control are important in inhibiting director self-reward and expropriation while political stability is more associated with increased likelihood of transparency in reporting of salaries. In addition firms from poor informational environments are more likely to initiate enhanced self-governance and transparency so as to overcome institutional deficiencies.

Suggested Citation

  • Hearn, Bruce, 2014. "Institutional impact on the expropriation of private benefits of control in North Africa," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 1-23.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:30:y:2014:i:c:p:1-23
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2013.04.002
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    2. Emenalo, Chukwunonye O. & Gagliardi, Francesca, 2020. "Is current institutional quality linked to legal origins and disease endowments? Evidence from Africa," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).

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