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Party competition and electoral turnout: Downs’s calculus in a multiparty system

In: Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions

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  • Juha Helin
  • Hannu Nurmi

Abstract

This extensive book explores in detail a wide range of topics within the public choice and constitutional political economy tradition, providing a comprehensive overview of current work across the field.

Suggested Citation

  • Juha Helin & Hannu Nurmi, 2013. "Party competition and electoral turnout: Downs’s calculus in a multiparty system," Chapters, in: Francisco Cabrillo & Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro (ed.), Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions, chapter 9, pages 160-176, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14863_9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Amihai Glazer & Bernard Grofman, 1992. "A positive correlation between turnout and plurality does not refute the rational voter model," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 85-93, February.
    2. Fuad Aleskerov & C. Emre Alper, 2000. "A Clustering Approach to Some Monetary Facts: A Long-Run Analysis of Cross-Country Data," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 51(4), pages 555-567, December.
    3. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    4. Saari, Donald G., 1989. "A dictionary for voting paradoxes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 443-475, August.
    5. Kramer, Gerald H., 1977. "A dynamical model of political equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 310-334, December.
    6. Moulin, Herve, 1988. "Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 53-64, June.
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