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The Political Economy of Deregulation in the US Gas Distribution Market

In: Does Economic Governance Matter?

Author

Listed:
  • Vladimir Hlasny

Abstract

This book contributes to the growing governance literature in three ways. First, it extends the analysis to new areas such as power asymmetry, regulation, transnational company strategies, and law enforcement. Secondly, it examines the role of formal institutions that shape and enforce the rules/norms codified in law; but also private-ordering institutions that function under the umbrella of the State; and private institutions (such as market rules/norms) that provide reputational and other information that foster compliance. Finally, the book extends and enriches the governance debate, addressing issues such as the determinants of institutional quality and efficiency, and the interaction between actor networks and institutional norms.

Suggested Citation

  • Vladimir Hlasny, 2011. "The Political Economy of Deregulation in the US Gas Distribution Market," Chapters, in: Mehmet Ugur & David Sunderland (ed.), Does Economic Governance Matter?, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14356_9
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    2. Palmer, Karen & Ando, Amy, 1998. "Getting on the Map: The Political Economy of State-Level Electricity Restructuring," RFF Working Paper Series dp-98-19-rev, Resources for the Future.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Business and Management; Economics and Finance; Politics and Public Policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities

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