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Contractual and Financing Arrangements for New Nuclear Investment in Liberalized Markets: Which Efficient Combination?

In: Security of Energy Supply in Europe

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  • Dominique Finon
  • Fabien Roques

Abstract

In economic, technical and political terms, the security of energy supply is of the utmost importance for Europe. Alongside competition and sustainability, supply security represents a cornerstone of the EU’s energy policy, and in times of rising geopolitical conflict plays an increasingly important role in its external relations. Within this context, the contributors analyse and explore the natural gas, nuclear, and hydrogen energy sectors, which will be of critical significance for the future of energy supplies in Europe.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Finon & Fabien Roques, 2010. "Contractual and Financing Arrangements for New Nuclear Investment in Liberalized Markets: Which Efficient Combination?," Chapters, in: François Lévêque & Jean-Michel Glachant & Julián Barquín & Christian von Hirschhausen & Franziska Ho (ed.), Security of Energy Supply in Europe, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:13887_6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. repec:bla:opecrv:v:32:y:2008:i:2:p:150-183 is not listed on IDEAS
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    4. Neuhoff, Karsten & De Vries, Laurens, 2004. "Insufficient incentives for investment in electricity generations," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 253-267, December.
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    6. Bredimas, Alexandre & Nuttall, William J., 2008. "An international comparison of regulatory organizations and licensing procedures for new nuclear power plants," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1344-1354, April.
    7. Levy, Brian & Spiller, Pablo T, 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 201-246, October.
    8. Karsten Neuhoff & Laurens De Vries, 2004. "Insufficient Incentives for Investment," Working Papers EP42, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
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    12. Roland Ismer & Karsten Neuhoff, 2006. "Commitments through Financial Options: A Way to Facilitate Compliance with Climate Change Obligations," Working Papers EPRG 0625, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
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