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Environmental Liability

In: Tort Law and Economics

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  • Michael Faure

Abstract

This volume provides a state-of-the-art overview of the literature on the economic analysis of tort law. In sixteen chapters, the specialist authors guide the reader through the often vast literature in each domain providing a balanced and comprehensive summary. Particular attention is paid to the evolution of the field, further refinements to economic models and relevant conclusions and lessons for the policymaker.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Faure, 2009. "Environmental Liability," Chapters, in: Michael Faure (ed.), Tort Law and Economics, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:12978_10
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    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/nlm-book/9781782547457/b1_chapter10.xml
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Friehe, Tim & Langlais, Eric, 2017. "Prevention and cleanup of dynamic harm under environmental liability," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 107-120.
    2. Massarutto, Antonio, 2014. "The long and winding road to resource efficiency – An interdisciplinary perspective on extended producer responsibility," Resources, Conservation & Recycling, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 11-21.

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