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Transparency, Flexibility, and Inflation Targeting

In: Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting

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  • Carl E. Walsh

    (University of California-Santa Cruz)

Abstract

Inflation targeting central banks have been at the forefront of the movement for greater transparency. In this paper, I explore two dimensions of transparency that are typically ignored in this literature — the quality of the information the central bank provides and how widely it publicizes its information. I show how the quality of the central bank’s forecasts and how widely these forecasts are disseminated can affect the central bank’s policy goals.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Carl E. Walsh, 2007. "Transparency, Flexibility, and Inflation Targeting," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Frederic S. Miskin & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Se (ed.),Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting, edition 1, volume 11, chapter 7, pages 227-263, Central Bank of Chile.
    • Handle: RePEc:chb:bcchsb:v11c07pp227-263
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pierpaolo Benigno & Michael Woodford, 2005. "Inflation Stabilization And Welfare: The Case Of A Distorted Steady State," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 3(6), pages 1185-1236, December.
    2. Mark Bils & Peter J. Klenow, 2004. "Some Evidence on the Importance of Sticky Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(5), pages 947-985, October.
    3. Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2002. "The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(2), pages 520-539, May.
    4. N. Gregory Mankiw & Ricardo Reis, 2002. "Sticky Information versus Sticky Prices: A Proposal to Replace the New Keynesian Phillips Curve," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(4), pages 1295-1328.
    5. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2006. "Social Value of Public Information: Comment: Morris and Shin (2002) Is Actually Pro-Transparency, Not Con," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 448-452, March.
    6. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2008. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 718-742, April.
    7. Henrik Jensen, 2002. "Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 104(3), pages 399-422, September.
    8. Eijffinger, Sylvester C.W. & Geraats, Petra M., 2006. "How transparent are central banks?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-21, March.
    9. Svensson, Lars E. O. & Woodford, Michael, 2004. "Indicator variables for optimal policy under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 661-690, January.
    10. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2002. "Social Value of Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1521-1534, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Romain Baeriswyl & Camille Cornand, 2007. "Monetary policy and its informative value," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue March, pages 1-34.
    2. Carlos Carrasco & Jesus Ferreiro, 2013. "Inflation targeting in Mexico," Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 35(3), pages 341-372.
    3. Salle, Isabelle & Yıldızoğlu, Murat & Sénégas, Marc-Alexandre, 2013. "Inflation targeting in a learning economy: An ABM perspective," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 114-128.
    4. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2008. "Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 718-742, April.
    5. Rodrigo Caputo & Felipe Liendo & Juan Pablo Medina, 2006. "New Keynesian Models For Chile During The Inflation Targeting Regime: A Structural Approach," Journal Economía Chilena (The Chilean Economy), Central Bank of Chile, vol. 9(3), pages 73-95, December.
    6. Paul Hubert, 2010. "Monetary policy, imperfect information and the expectations channel [Politique monétaire,information imparfaite et canal des anticipations]," SciencePo Working papers Main tel-04095385, HAL.
    7. Di Giorgio, Giorgio & Traficante, Guido, 2013. "The loss from uncertainty on policy targets," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 175-182.
    8. Camille Cornand & Frank Heinemann, 2014. "Experiments on Monetary Policy and Central Banking," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Experiments in Macroeconomics, volume 17, pages 167-227, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    9. Salle, Isabelle L., 2015. "Modeling expectations in agent-based models — An application to central bank's communication and monetary policy," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 130-141.
    10. Carl E. Walsh, 2013. "Announcements and the Role of Policy Guidance," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Nov, pages 575-600.
    11. Anna Agliari & Domenico Massaro & Nicolò Pecora & Alessandro Spelta, 2017. "Inflation Targeting, Recursive Inattentiveness, and Heterogeneous Beliefs," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(7), pages 1587-1619, October.
    12. Carlos A. Carrasco & Jesús Ferreiro, 2011. "Inflation Targeting and Economic Performance: The Case of Mexico," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 58(5), pages 675-692, December.
    13. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/f4rshpf3v1umfa09lat09b1bg is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Cheick Kader M'Baye, 2012. "Inflation Targeting under Heterogeneous Information and Sticky Prices," Working Papers halshs-00677671, HAL.
    15. Petra Geraats, 2014. "Transparency, Flexibility and Macroeconomic Stabilization," CESifo Working Paper Series 4642, CESifo.
    16. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/f4rshpf3v1umfa09lat09b1bg is not listed on IDEAS
    17. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/f4rshpf3v1umfa09lat09b1bg is not listed on IDEAS
    18. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/f4rshpf3v1umfa09lat09b1bg is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Serge Jeanneau, 2009. "Communication of monetary policy decisions by central banks: what is revealed and why," BIS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 47.
    20. J. Scott Davis & Ippei Fujiwara & Jiao Wang, 2018. "Dealing with Time Inconsistency: Inflation Targeting versus Exchange Rate Targeting," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(7), pages 1369-1399, October.
    21. Carl Walsh, 2007. "Inflation Targeting and the Role of Real Objectives," Research and Policy Notes 2007/02, Czech National Bank.

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