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Lucas Rentschler

Personal Details

First Name:Lucas
Middle Name:
Last Name:Rentschler
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pre443
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://lucasrentschler.com
Terminal Degree: (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

(17%) Economic Science Institute (ESI)
Argyros School of Business and Economics
Chapman University

Orange, California (United States)
http://www.chapman.edu/ESI/
RePEc:edi:esichus (more details at EDIRC)

(83%) Department of Economics and Finance
Jon M. Huntsman School of Business
Utah State University

Logan, Utah (United States)
https://huntsman.usu.edu/economicsandfinance/index
RePEc:edi:deusuus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Diego Aycinena & Szabolcs Blazsek & Lucas Rentschler & Charles Sprenger, 2020. "Intertemporal Choice Experiments and Large-Stakes Behavior," Working Papers 20-36, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  2. Aycinena, D & Elbittar, A & Gomberg, A & Rentschler, L, 2020. "Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It’s a matter of timing," Documentos de Trabajo 18358, Universidad del Rosario.
  3. Diego Aycinena & Alexander Elbittar & Andrei Gomberg & Lucas Rentschler, 2020. "Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It’s a matter of timing," Working Papers 20-26, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  4. Theodore L. Turocy & Lucas Rentschler, 2014. "Two Bidder All-Pay Auctions with Interdependent Valuations, including the Highly Competitive Case," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 063, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

Articles

  1. Aycinena, Diego & Elbittar, Alexander & Gomberg, Andrei & Rentschler, Lucas, 2023. "Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It's a matter of timing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 182-195.
  2. Aimone, Jason A. & Hudja, Stanton & Law, Wilson & North, Charles M. & Ralston, Jason & Rentschler, Lucas, 2023. "An experimental exploration of reasonable doubt," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 873-886.
  3. Jason Ralston & Jason Aimone & Lucas Rentschler & Charles North, 2023. "Prosecutor plea bargaining and conviction rate structure: evidence from an experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 299-329, September.
  4. Jordan Adamson & Lucas Rentschler, 2023. "Criminal justice from a public choice perspective: an introduction to the special issue," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 223-227, September.
  5. Diego Aycinena & Lucas Rentschler & Benjamin Beranek & Jonathan F. Schulz, 2022. "Social norms and dishonesty across societies," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 119(31), pages 2120138119-, August.
  6. Aycinena, Diego & Blazsek, Szabolcs & Rentschler, Lucas & Sprenger, Charles, 2022. "Intertemporal choice experiments and large-stakes behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 196(C), pages 484-500.
  7. Diego Aycinena & Szabolcs Blazsek & Lucas Rentschler & Betzy Sandoval, 2019. "Smoothing, discounting, and demand for intra-household control for recipients of conditional cash transfers," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 219-242, January.
  8. James W. Boudreau & Lucas Rentschler & Shane Sanders, 2019. "Stag hunt contests and alliance formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 267-285, June.
  9. Aycinena, Diego & Rentschler, Lucas, 2019. "Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
  10. Diego Aycinena & Rimvydas Baltaduonis & Lucas Rentschler, 2019. "Valuation structure in incomplete information contests: experimental evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 195-208, June.
  11. Aimone, Jason A. & North, Charles & Rentschler, Lucas, 2019. "Priming the jury by asking for Donations: An empirical and experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 158-167.
  12. Diego Aycinena & Hernán Bejarano & Lucas Rentschler, 2018. "Informed entry in auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 175-205, March.
  13. Grosskopf, Brit & Rentschler, Lucas & Sarin, Rajiv, 2018. "An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: The blessed winner," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 40-64.
  14. Diego Aycinena & Lucas Rentschler, 2018. "Auctions with endogenous participation and an uncertain number of bidders: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(4), pages 924-949, December.
  15. Rentschler, Lucas & Turocy, Theodore L., 2016. "Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 435-466.
  16. Diego Aycinena & Rimvydas Baltaduonis & Lucas Rentschler, 2014. "Risk Preferences and Prenatal Exposure to Sex Hormones for Ladinos," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(8), pages 1-10, August.
  17. Diego Aycinena & Rimvydas Baltaduonis & Lucas Rentschler, 2014. "Valuation structure in first-price and least-revenue auctions: an experimental investigation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(1), pages 100-128, March.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Diego Aycinena & Szabolcs Blazsek & Lucas Rentschler & Charles Sprenger, 2020. "Intertemporal Choice Experiments and Large-Stakes Behavior," Working Papers 20-36, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.

    Cited by:

    1. James Andreoni & Christina Gravert & Michael A. Kuhn & Silvia Saccardo & Yang Yang, 2018. "Arbitrage Or Narrow Bracketing? On Using Money to Measure Intertemporal Preferences," NBER Working Papers 25232, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Stephen L. Cheung & Agnieszka Tymula & Xueting Wang, 2022. "Present bias for monetary and dietary rewards," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(4), pages 1202-1233, September.
    3. David J. Freeman & Kevin Laughren, 2024. "Task completion without commitment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(2), pages 273-298, April.

  2. Theodore L. Turocy & Lucas Rentschler, 2014. "Two Bidder All-Pay Auctions with Interdependent Valuations, including the Highly Competitive Case," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 063, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..

    Cited by:

    1. Xiao, Jun, 2018. "Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: Complete results," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C), pages 21-34.
    2. Blake A. Allison & Jason J. Lepore, 2024. "Invariant Equilibrium in Discontinuous Bayesian Games," Games, MDPI, vol. 15(3), pages 1-14, May.
    3. Zheng, Charles Z., 2019. "Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: Implementability versus security," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 180(C), pages 135-166.
    4. Chi, Chang Koo & Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso, 2017. "All-pay auctions with affiliated values," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 13/2017, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.
    5. Lu, Jingfeng & Parreiras, Sérgio O., 2017. "Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions Redux," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 78-91.
    6. Doni Nicola & Menicucci Domenico, 2019. "A First Price Auction with an Arbitrary Number of Asymmetric Bidders," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 1-7, June.
    7. Shanglyu Deng & Hanming Fang & Qiang Fu & Zenan Wu, 2023. "Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests," NBER Working Papers 31036, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Prokopovych, Pavlo & Yannelis, Nicholas C., 2023. "On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 348-362.
    9. Stefano Barbieri & Kai A. Konrad, 2021. "Overzealous Rule Makers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(2), pages 341-365.
    10. Diego Aycinena & Rimvydas Baltaduonis & Lucas Rentschler, 2019. "Valuation structure in incomplete information contests: experimental evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 195-208, June.
    11. Yangguang Huang & Ming He, 2021. "Structural Analysis Of Tullock Contests With An Application To U.S. House Of Representatives Elections," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(3), pages 1011-1054, August.
    12. Tracy Xiao Liu, 2018. "All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 247-271, March.
    13. Jingfeng Lu & Hongkun Ma & Zhe Wang, 2018. "Ranking Disclosure Policies In All‐Pay Auctions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(3), pages 1464-1485, July.
    14. Zhuoqiong Chen, 2021. "All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents’ values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(1), pages 33-64, June.
    15. Chi, Chang Koo & Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso, 2019. "All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 99-130.
    16. Chi, Chang Koo, 2018. "An analysis of the two-bidder all-pay auction with common values," Discussion Paper Series in Economics 17/2018, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Diego Aycinena & Lucas Rentschler & Benjamin Beranek & Jonathan F. Schulz, 2022. "Social norms and dishonesty across societies," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 119(31), pages 2120138119-, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Bartling, Björn & Özdemir, Yagiz, 2023. "The limits to moral erosion in markets: Social norms and the replacement excuse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 143-160.

  2. Aycinena, Diego & Blazsek, Szabolcs & Rentschler, Lucas & Sprenger, Charles, 2022. "Intertemporal choice experiments and large-stakes behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 196(C), pages 484-500.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Diego Aycinena & Szabolcs Blazsek & Lucas Rentschler & Betzy Sandoval, 2019. "Smoothing, discounting, and demand for intra-household control for recipients of conditional cash transfers," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 219-242, January.

    Cited by:

    1. David J. Freeman & Kevin Laughren, 2024. "Task completion without commitment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(2), pages 273-298, April.
    2. Giuseppe Arcangelis & Majlinda Joxhe, 2021. "Intra-household allocation with shared expenditure choices: experimental evidence from Filipino migrants," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 1245-1274, December.

  4. James W. Boudreau & Lucas Rentschler & Shane Sanders, 2019. "Stag hunt contests and alliance formation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 267-285, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Simon Medcalfe & Shane Sanders, 2024. "Empirical and computational approaches to collective choice: introduction to a special issue," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 199(1), pages 1-5, April.
    2. Ricardo Nieva, 2021. "Heterogeneous coalitions and social revolutions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 33(2), pages 229-275, May.
    3. Sophie Bienenstock & Pierre Kopp, 2023. "The extensive reach of the FCPA beyond American borders: Is a bad deal always better than a good trial?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 381-401, September.
    4. Aniruddha Bagchi & João Ricardo Faria & Timothy Mathews, 2019. "A model of a multilateral proxy war with spillovers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 229-248, June.
    5. Justin Ehrlich & Matthew Harmon & Shane Sanders, 2020. "The alliance formation puzzle in contests with capacity-constraints: A test using American football reception-coverage contest data," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(3), pages 1-13, March.
    6. Shane Sanders, 2023. "Environmental Status Goods and Market-Based Conservation: An Arm of Ostrom’s Polycentric Approach?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(5), pages 1-9, February.
    7. Timothy Mathews & Shane Sanders, 2019. "Strategic and experimental analyses of conflict and terrorism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 169-174, June.
    8. Jeremy Kettering & Shane Sanders, 2024. "Bargaining in the shadow of conflict: resource division and War’s Inefficiency Puzzle in the commons," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 199(1), pages 83-101, April.

  5. Aycinena, Diego & Rentschler, Lucas, 2019. "Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).

    Cited by:

    1. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Entry in group contests," Working Papers wp2020_02_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    2. Jiao, Qian & Ke, Changxia & Liu, Yang, 2022. "When to disclose the number of contestants: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 146-160.

  6. Diego Aycinena & Rimvydas Baltaduonis & Lucas Rentschler, 2019. "Valuation structure in incomplete information contests: experimental evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 195-208, June.

    Cited by:

    1. James W. Boudreau & Haikady N. Nagaraja & Lucas Rentschler & Shane D. Sanders, 2024. "The role of luck in political and economic competition: noisy all-pay auctions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 199(1), pages 137-157, April.

  7. Aimone, Jason A. & North, Charles & Rentschler, Lucas, 2019. "Priming the jury by asking for Donations: An empirical and experimental study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 158-167.

    Cited by:

    1. Novella, Rafael & Ramirez, Ericka G. Rascón, 2024. "Question-order effects on judgements under uncertainty," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    2. Aimone, Jason A. & Hudja, Stanton & Law, Wilson & North, Charles M. & Ralston, Jason & Rentschler, Lucas, 2023. "An experimental exploration of reasonable doubt," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 873-886.
    3. Lundberg, Alexander & Mungan, Murat, 2022. "The effect of evidentiary rules on conviction rates," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 203(C), pages 563-576.
    4. Jason Ralston & Jason Aimone & Lucas Rentschler & Charles North, 2023. "Prosecutor plea bargaining and conviction rate structure: evidence from an experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 299-329, September.
    5. Jonathan H.W. Tan & Zhao Zichen & Daniel John Zizzo, 2023. "Scientific Inference from Field and Laboratory Economic Experiments: Empirical Evidence," Discussion Papers Series 663, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.

  8. Diego Aycinena & Hernán Bejarano & Lucas Rentschler, 2018. "Informed entry in auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 175-205, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Joyce Delnoij & Kris Jaegher, 2020. "Competing first-price and second-price auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 69(1), pages 183-216, February.
    2. J.M.J. Delnoij & K.J.M. De Jaegher, 2016. "Competing first-price and second-price auctions," Working Papers 16-07, Utrecht School of Economics.
    3. Niklas Klarnskou & Philippos Louis & Wouter Passtoors, 2024. "Feedback and Competition in Procurement e-Auctions," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 04-2024, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    4. Aycinena, Diego & Rentschler, Lucas, 2019. "Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).

  9. Grosskopf, Brit & Rentschler, Lucas & Sarin, Rajiv, 2018. "An experiment on first-price common-value auctions with asymmetric information structures: The blessed winner," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 40-64.

    Cited by:

    1. Andrea Albertazzi & Friederike Mengel & Ronald Peeters, 2021. "Benchmarking information aggregation in experimental markets," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(4), pages 1500-1516, October.

  10. Diego Aycinena & Lucas Rentschler, 2018. "Auctions with endogenous participation and an uncertain number of bidders: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(4), pages 924-949, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Luke Boosey & Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2020. "Entry in group contests," Working Papers wp2020_02_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.
    2. Yunmi Kong, 2020. "Not knowing the competition: evidence and implications for auction design," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 840-867, September.
    3. Niklas Klarnskou & Philippos Louis & Wouter Passtoors, 2024. "Feedback and Competition in Procurement e-Auctions," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 04-2024, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
    4. Diego Aycinena & Hernán Bejarano & Lucas Rentschler, 2018. "Informed entry in auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(1), pages 175-205, March.
    5. Jiao, Qian & Ke, Changxia & Liu, Yang, 2022. "When to disclose the number of contestants: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 193(C), pages 146-160.
    6. Aycinena, Diego & Rentschler, Lucas, 2019. "Entry in contests with incomplete information: Theory and experiments," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).

  11. Rentschler, Lucas & Turocy, Theodore L., 2016. "Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 435-466.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  12. Diego Aycinena & Rimvydas Baltaduonis & Lucas Rentschler, 2014. "Risk Preferences and Prenatal Exposure to Sex Hormones for Ladinos," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 9(8), pages 1-10, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Judit Alonso & Roberto Di Paolo & Giovanni Ponti & Marcello Sartarelli, 2017. "Some (Mis)facts about 2D:4D, Preferences and Personality," Working Papers. Serie AD 2017-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    2. Pablo Brañas-Garza & Matteo M. Galizzi & Jeroen Nieboer, 2014. "Digit ratio and risk taking: Evidence from a large, multi-ethnic sample," Working Papers 14-23, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    3. Neyse, Levent & Johannesson, Magnus & Dreber, Anna, 2021. "2D:4D does not predict economic preferences: Evidence from a large, representative sample," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 185(C), pages 390-401.
    4. Parslow, Elle & Ranehill, Eva & Zethraeus, Niklas & Blomberg, Liselott & von Schoultz, Bo & Lindén Hirschberg, Angelica & Johannesson, Magnus & Dreber, Anna, 2019. "The digit ratio (2D:4D) and economic preferences: no robust associations in a sample of 330 women," Working Papers in Economics 750, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    5. Sergio Da Silva & Bruno Moreira & Newton Da Costa Jr, 2015. "Handedness and digit ratio predict overconfidence in cognitive and motor skill tasks in a sample of preschoolers," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(2), pages 1087-1097.
    6. Burkhard Schipper, 2014. "Sex hormones and choice under risk," Working Papers 129, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    7. Levent Neyse & Ferdinand M. Vieider & Patrick Ring & Catharina Probst & Christian Kaernbach & Thilo Eimeren & Ulrich Schmidt, 2020. "Risk attitudes and digit ratio (2D:4D): Evidence from prospect theory," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 29-51, February.
    8. Candelo, Natalia & Eckel, Catherine, 2018. "The 2D:4D ratio does not always correlate with economic behavior: A field experiment with African-Americans," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 172-181.
    9. Thomas Meissner & Xavier Gassmann & Corinne Faure & Joachim Schleich, 2023. "Individual characteristics associated with risk and time preferences: A multi country representative survey," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 66(1), pages 77-107, February.
    10. Brañas-Garza, Pablo & Espín, Antonio M. & Garcia, Teresa & Kovářík, Jaromír, 2018. "Digit ratio (2D:4D) predicts pro-social behavior in economic games only for unsatisfied individuals," MPRA Paper 86166, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Galizzi, Matteo M. & Nieboer, Jeroen, 2015. "Digit ratio (2D:4D) and altruism: evidence from a large, multi-ethnic sample," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 60982, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

  13. Diego Aycinena & Rimvydas Baltaduonis & Lucas Rentschler, 2014. "Valuation structure in first-price and least-revenue auctions: an experimental investigation," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(1), pages 100-128, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Jeannette Brosig-Koch & Werner Güth & Torsten Weiland, 2016. "Comparing the effectiveness of collusion devices in first-price procurement: an auction experiment," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 269-295, December.
    2. Sascha Füllbrunn & Dirk‐Jan Janssen & Utz Weitzel, 2019. "Risk Aversion And Overbidding In First Price Sealed Bid Auctions: New Experimental Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(1), pages 631-647, January.
    3. David J. Freeman & Erik O. Kimbrough & Garrett M. Petersen & Hanh T. Tong, 2017. "Instructions," Discussion Papers dp17-12, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 5 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (4) 2020-09-07 2020-09-21 2020-10-05 2021-03-22
  2. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (4) 2020-09-07 2020-09-21 2020-10-05 2021-03-22
  3. NEP-DCM: Discrete Choice Models (3) 2020-09-21 2020-10-05 2021-03-22
  4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2014-06-14
  5. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2014-06-14
  6. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2014-06-14

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