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Prosecutor plea bargaining and conviction rate structure: evidence from an experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Jason Ralston

    (Whitman College)

  • Jason Aimone

    (Baylor University)

  • Lucas Rentschler

    (Utah State University)

  • Charles North

    (Baylor University)

Abstract

We present a model of plea bargaining and vary the value a prosecutor places on a conviction obtained via plea bargain relative to a conviction obtained at trial. We show that increasing the relative value of a plea bargain increases the trial penalty and decreases the severity of the equilibrium plea bargain. We report the results of an exploratory experiment which assesses this prediction in a more realistic setting, in which subjects are incentivized by conviction rates. Our treatment variable is whether convictions obtained via plea bargain are included in conviction rate calculations. Including plea bargains in conviction rates increases the number of plea offers made and increases the trial penalty, which is qualitatively in line with our predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Jason Ralston & Jason Aimone & Lucas Rentschler & Charles North, 2023. "Prosecutor plea bargaining and conviction rate structure: evidence from an experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(3), pages 299-329, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:196:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-023-01081-w
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01081-w
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Eric Rasmusen & Manu Raghav & Mark Ramseyer, 2009. "Convictions versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor's Choice," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 11(1), pages 47-78.
    7. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1988. "Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 713-728, September.
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