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Daniel Karabekyan

Personal Details

First Name:Daniel
Middle Name:
Last Name:Karabekyan
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pka790
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://www.hse.ru/en/org/persons/244612
Terminal Degree:2012 Faculty of Economics; National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

(50%) International Laboratory of Decision Choice and Analysis
National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE)

Moscow, Russia
http://www.hse.ru/DeCAn/
RePEc:edi:ldhseru (more details at EDIRC)

(50%) Faculty of Economics
National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE)

Moscow, Russia
http://economics.hse.ru/
RePEc:edi:fehseru (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters

Working papers

  1. Daniel Karabekyan, 2016. "Strategic Behavior in Exhaustive Ballot Voting: What Can We Learn from the FIFA World Cup 2018 and 2022 Host Elections?," HSE Working papers WP BRP 130/EC/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

Articles

  1. Karabekyan, D., 2022. "On the stability of results for aggregation procedures," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 57(5), pages 24-37.
  2. Aleskerov, F. & Kazachinskaya, A. & Karabekyan, D. & Semina, A. & Yakuba, V., 2021. "Economic journals of Russia, their characteristics and network analysis," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 50(2), pages 170-182.
  3. Aleskerov, Fuad & Karabekyan, Daniel & Sanver, M. Remzi & Yakuba, Vyacheslav, 2012. "On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternatives," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 67-73.
  4. Fuad Aleskerov & Daniel Karabekyan & M. Sanver & Vyacheslav Yakuba, 2011. "An individual manipulability of positional voting rules," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 431-446, December.
  5. Fuad Aleskerov & Daniel Karabekyan & Remzi Sanver & Vyacheslav Yakuba, 2009. "Evaluating the Degree of Manipulability of Certain Aggregation Procedures under Multiple Choices," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 1-2, pages 37-61.

Chapters

  1. Fuad Aleskerov & Alexander Ivanov & Daniel Karabekyan & Vyacheslav Yakuba, 2023. "On the Individual and Coalitional Manipulability of q-Paretian Social Choice Rules," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Sascha Kurz & Nicola Maaser & Alexander Mayer (ed.), Advances in Collective Decision Making, pages 95-111, Springer.
  2. Fuad Aleskerov & Daniel Karabekyan & Alexander Ivanov & Vyacheslav Yakuba, 2021. "Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin (ed.), Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, pages 231-249, Springer.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Daniel Karabekyan, 2016. "Strategic Behavior in Exhaustive Ballot Voting: What Can We Learn from the FIFA World Cup 2018 and 2022 Host Elections?," HSE Working papers WP BRP 130/EC/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Dagaev, D., 2018. "Decision-Making in International Sports Organizations - a Survey," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 40(4), pages 167-174.

Articles

  1. Aleskerov, Fuad & Karabekyan, Daniel & Sanver, M. Remzi & Yakuba, Vyacheslav, 2012. "On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternatives," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 67-73.

    Cited by:

    1. Lirong Xia, 2022. "The Impact of a Coalition: Assessing the Likelihood of Voter Influence in Large Elections," Papers 2202.06411, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
    2. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2024. "Mechanisms to Appoint Arbitrator Panels or Sets of Judges by Compromise Between Concerned Parties," Working Papers 1442, Barcelona School of Economics.
    3. Mostapha Diss & Boris Tsvelikhovskiy, 2019. "Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules," Papers 1911.09173, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2020.
    4. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa, 2020. "Simulations in Models of Preference Aggregation," Post-Print hal-02424936, HAL.
    5. Alexander Karpov, 2020. "The likelihood of single-peaked preferences under classic and new probability distribution assumptions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(4), pages 629-644, December.
    6. Gori, Michele, 2021. "Manipulation of social choice functions under incomplete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 350-369.
    7. Bednay, Dezső & Moskalenko, Anna & Tasnádi, Attila, 2019. "Dictatorship versus manipulability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 72-76.
    8. Yuliya A. Veselova, 2020. "Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 523-548, June.
    9. Jansen, C. & Schollmeyer, G. & Augustin, T., 2018. "A probabilistic evaluation framework for preference aggregation reflecting group homogeneity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 49-62.
    10. Daniel Karabekyan, 2016. "Strategic Behavior in Exhaustive Ballot Voting: What Can We Learn from the FIFA World Cup 2018 and 2022 Host Elections?," HSE Working papers WP BRP 130/EC/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    11. Aleksei Y. Kondratev & Alexander S. Nesterov, 2020. "Measuring majority power and veto power of voting rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(1), pages 187-210, April.
    12. Yuliya A. Veselova, 2016. "Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?," HSE Working papers WP BRP 152/EC/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

  2. Fuad Aleskerov & Daniel Karabekyan & M. Sanver & Vyacheslav Yakuba, 2011. "An individual manipulability of positional voting rules," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(4), pages 431-446, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Lirong Xia, 2022. "The Impact of a Coalition: Assessing the Likelihood of Voter Influence in Large Elections," Papers 2202.06411, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
    2. Krzysztof Kontek & Honorata Sosnowska, 2020. "Specific Tastes or Cliques of Jurors? How to Reduce the Level of Manipulation in Group Decisions?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(6), pages 1057-1084, December.
    3. Bednay, Dezső & Moskalenko, Anna & Tasnádi, Attila, 2019. "Dictatorship versus manipulability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 72-76.
    4. Yuliya A. Veselova, 2020. "Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 523-548, June.
    5. Ivanov, A., 2022. "On the algorithms of exact estimations of manipulability of social choice rules for the case of 3 alternatives," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 57(5), pages 14-23.
    6. Daniel Karabekyan, 2016. "Strategic Behavior in Exhaustive Ballot Voting: What Can We Learn from the FIFA World Cup 2018 and 2022 Host Elections?," HSE Working papers WP BRP 130/EC/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

  3. Fuad Aleskerov & Daniel Karabekyan & Remzi Sanver & Vyacheslav Yakuba, 2009. "Evaluating the Degree of Manipulability of Certain Aggregation Procedures under Multiple Choices," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 1-2, pages 37-61.

    Cited by:

    1. Bednay, Dezső & Moskalenko, Anna & Tasnádi, Attila, 2019. "Dictatorship versus manipulability," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 72-76.
    2. Yuliya A. Veselova, 2020. "Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 523-548, June.
    3. Karabekyan, D., 2022. "On the stability of results for aggregation procedures," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 57(5), pages 24-37.
    4. Yuliya A. Veselova, 2016. "Does Incomplete Information Reduce Manipulability?," HSE Working papers WP BRP 152/EC/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

Chapters

  1. Fuad Aleskerov & Daniel Karabekyan & Alexander Ivanov & Vyacheslav Yakuba, 2021. "Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin (ed.), Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, pages 231-249, Springer.

    Cited by:

    1. Abdelhalim El Ouafdi & Dominique Lepelley & Jérôme Serais & Hatem Smaoui, 2022. "Comparing the manipulability of approval, evaluative and plurality voting with trichotomous preferences," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 2(8), pages 1-22, August.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2016-04-04
  2. NEP-SPO: Sports and Economics (1) 2016-04-04

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