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Decision-Making in International Sports Organizations - a Survey

Author

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  • Dagaev, D.

    (National Research University - Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia)

Abstract

This paper surveys the literature on decision-making in international sports organizations. The International Olympic Committee, the Federation Internationale de Football Association and many other federations delegate decision-making to internal committees. A complicated structure of those committees that reflects the international status of federations, a unique type of decisions that is inherent to sports industry, and specifi c decision-making mechanisms attract the researchers' attention. The survey is comprised of four paragraphs. The first paragraph briefly reviews papers aimed at studying preferences of the international sports federations committee members. The second paragraph is devoted to papers that analyze determinants of success of bids for hosting sporting mega-events. In the third paragraph we discuss different ways to fight corruption in decision-making bodies of international sports federations. Finally, we touch on the problem of accountability in international sports federations. The focus of the paper is on the economics literature, and it is not aimed to discuss a wide literature on such topics as management of sport organizations or psychology of decision-making.

Suggested Citation

  • Dagaev, D., 2018. "Decision-Making in International Sports Organizations - a Survey," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 40(4), pages 167-174.
    • Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2018:i:40:p:167-174
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John Morgan & Felix Várdy, 2011. "On the buyability of voting bodies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(2), pages 260-287, April.
    2. Daniel Karabekyan, 2016. "Strategic Behavior in Exhaustive Ballot Voting: What Can We Learn from the FIFA World Cup 2018 and 2022 Host Elections?," HSE Working papers WP BRP 130/EC/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
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    5. Matthews Gregory J. & Tuy Pétala Gardênia da Silva Estrela & Arthur Robert K., 2017. "An examination of statistical disclosure issues related to publication of aggregate statistics in the presence of a known subset of the dataset using Baseball Hall of Fame ballots," Journal of Quantitative Analysis in Sports, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-10, March.
    6. Wolfgang Maennig & Christopher Vierhaus, 2017. "Winning the Olympic host city election: key success factors," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(31), pages 3086-3099, July.
    7. Heckelman, J C, 1995. "The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Voter Turnout Rates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 82(1-2), pages 107-124, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    sport; international organizations; decision-making; voting; corruption; FIFA;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • Z21 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics - - - Industry Studies

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