Tomohiko Kawamori

Personal Details

First Name:	Tomohiko
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Kawamori
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pka562
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
	https://sites.google.com/view/tkawamori/
Terminal Degree:	2008 Faculty of Economics; University of Tokyo (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Faculty of Economics
Meijo University

Nagoya, Japan
http://wwwecono.meijo-u.ac.jp/
RePEc:edi:femeijp (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

Sorry, no citations of working papers recorded.

Articles

1. Kawamori, Tomohiko & Miyakawa, Toshiji, 2019. "Bargaining delay under partial breakdowns and externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-1.

   Cited by:

   1. Montero, M.P., 1999. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Other publications TiSEM 125b271e-7a2b-4123-823d-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Maria Montero, 2023. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 525-548, June.
      • Maria Montero, 2021. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Discussion Papers 2021-05, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
      • Montero, M.P., 1999. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Discussion Paper 1999-121, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

2. Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2019. "Bilateral bargaining with endogenous status quo," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).

   Cited by:

   1. Zhongwei Feng & Chunqiao Tan & Jinchun Zhang & Qiang Zeng, 2021. "Bargaining Game with Altruistic and Spiteful Preferences," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 277-300, April.
   2. Zhongwei Feng & Yan Ma & Yuzhong Yang, 2023. "Credibilistic Cournot Game with Risk Aversion under a Fuzzy Environment," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-18, February.

3. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2016. "Hart–Mas-Colell implementation of the discounted Shapley value," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 357-369, September.

   Cited by:

   1. Marco Rogna, 2020. "The Burning Coalition Bargaining Model," BEMPS - Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series BEMPS69, Faculty of Economics and Management at the Free University of Bozen.
      • Marco Rogna, 2022. "The Burning Coalition Bargaining Model," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(3), pages 735-768, October.
   2. Calvo, Emilio & Gutiérrez-López, Esther, 2021. "Recursive and bargaining values," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 97-106.

4. Kawamori, Tomohiko & Miyakawa, Toshiji, 2016. "Nash bargaining solution under externalities," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 1-7.

   Cited by:

   1. Montero, M.P., 1999. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Other publications TiSEM 125b271e-7a2b-4123-823d-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Maria Montero, 2023. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 525-548, June.
      • Maria Montero, 2021. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Discussion Papers 2021-05, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
      • Montero, M.P., 1999. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Discussion Paper 1999-121, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
   2. Yang, Guangjing & Sun, Hao & Hou, Dongshuang & Xu, Genjiu, 2020. "A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 34-40.
   3. Kawamori, Tomohiko & Miyakawa, Toshiji, 2019. "Bargaining delay under partial breakdowns and externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-1.

5. Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2014. "A noncooperative foundation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 12-15.

   Cited by:

   1. Roberto Serrano, 2020. "Sixty-Seven Years of the Nash Program: Time for Retirement?," Working Papers 2020-20, Brown University, Department of Economics.
      • Roberto Serrano, 2021. "Sixty-seven years of the Nash program: time for retirement?," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 35-48, March.
   2. Mao, Liang, 2020. "Optimal recommendation in two-player bargaining games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 41-45.
   3. William Thomson, 2022. "On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 491-542, December.
   4. Andersson, Ola & Argenton, Cédric & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2018. "Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 1-5.

6. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2013. "Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 27-40, January.

   Cited by:

   1. Masanori Mitsutsune & Takanori Adachi, 2014. "Estimating noncooperative and cooperative models of bargaining: an empirical comparison," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 669-693, September.
      • Masanori Mitsutsune & Takanori Adachi, 2011. "Estimating Noncooperative and Cooperative Models of Bargaining: An Empirical Comparison," KIER Working Papers 799, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
   2. Eraslan, Hülya & McLennan, Andrew, 2013. "Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2195-2222.
      • Andrew McLennan & H�lya Eraslan, 2010. "Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining," Economics Working Paper Archive 562, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
   3. P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba, 2022. "Costless delay in negotiations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(1), pages 69-93, July.
      • Herings, P.J.J. & Houba, H, 2015. "Costless delay in negotiations," Research Memorandum 002, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
      • P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Harold Houba, 2015. "Costless Delay in Negotiations," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-010/II, Tinbergen Institute.
   4. Britz, Volker, 2018. "Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 1-20.
   5. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2021. "Core equivalence in collective-choice bargaining under minimal assumptions," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(2), pages 259-267, October.
   6. Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2022. "Coalition-then-allocation legislative bargaining," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).

7. Kawamori, Tomohiko & Lin, Ming Hsin, 2013. "Airline mergers with low cost carriers," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 63-71.

   Cited by:

   1. Lin, Ming Hsin, 2021. "Airport pricing and capacity: Schedule versus congestion delays," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
   2. Lin, Ming Hsin & Zhang, Yimin, 2017. "Hub-airport congestion pricing and capacity investment," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 89-106.
   3. Fageda, Xavier & Flores-Fillol, Ricardo & Lin, Ming Hsin, 2020. "Vertical differentiation and airline alliances: The effect of antitrust immunity," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
   4. Ko, Young Dae, 2016. "An airline's management strategies in a competitive air transport market," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 53-61.
   5. Sibdari, Soheil & Mohammadian, Iman & Pyke, David F., 2018. "On the impact of jet fuel cost on airlines’ capacity choice: Evidence from the U.S. domestic markets," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 1-17.
   6. Morandi, Valentina & Malighetti, Paolo & Paleari, Stefano & Redondi, Renato, 2015. "Codesharing agreements by low-cost carriers: An explorative analysis," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 184-191.
   7. Wang, Yixiao & Sun, Luoyi & Teunter, Ruud H. & Wu, Jianhong & Hua, Guowei, 2020. "Effects of introducing low-cost high-speed rail on air-rail competition: Modelling and numerical analysis for Paris-Marseille," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 145-162.

8. Kawamori, Tomohiko & Yamaguchi, Kazuo, 2010. "Outcomes of bargaining and planning in single facility location problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 38-45, January.

   Cited by:

   1. Kazuo Yamaguchi, 2016. "Borda winner in facility location problems on sphere," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(4), pages 893-898, April.
   2. Yamaguchi, Kazuo, 2011. "Location of an undesirable facility on a network: A bargaining approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 104-108, September.
   3. Kazuo Yamaguchi, 2022. "Spatial bargaining in rectilinear facility location problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(1), pages 69-104, July.

9. Hiroaki Ino & Tomohiko Kawamori, 2009. "Oligopoly with a large number of competitors: asymmetric limit result," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(2), pages 331-352, May.
   • Hiroaki Ino & Tomohiko Kawamori, 2009. "Oligopoly with a large number of competitors: asymmetric limit result," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(2), pages 353-353, May.

   Cited by:

   1. Theophilus Lartey & Diana Owusu Yirenkyi & Samuel Adomako & Albert Danso & Joseph Amankwah‐Amoah & Ashraful Alam, 2020. "Going green, going clean: Lean‐green sustainability strategy and firm growth," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 118-139, January.
   2. Naoto Jinji, 2013. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly: A Generalized Result," Discussion papers e-12-011, Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University.
      • Jinji, Naoto, 2014. "Comparative statics for oligopoly: A generalized result," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(1), pages 79-82.
   3. Hiroaki Ino & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2009. "How Many Firms Should Be Leaders? Beneficial Concentration Revisited," Discussion Paper Series 48, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Oct 2009.
      • Hiroaki Ino & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2012. "How Many Firms Should Be Leaders? Beneficial Concentration Revisited," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1323-1340, November.
   4. Hiroaki Ino & Tomohiko Kawamori, 2009. "Oligopoly with a large number of competitors: asymmetric limit result," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(2), pages 331-352, May.
      • Hiroaki Ino & Tomohiko Kawamori, 2009. "Oligopoly with a large number of competitors: asymmetric limit result," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 39(2), pages 353-353, May.
   5. Junichiro Ishida & Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2010. "Market Competition, R&D and Firm Profits in Asymmetric Oligopoly," ISER Discussion Paper 0777, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
      • Junichiro Ishida & Toshihiro Matsumura & Noriaki Matsushima, 2011. "Market Competition, R&D And Firm Profits In Asymmetric Oligopoly," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(3), pages 484-505, September.
   6. Makoto Yano & Takashi Komatsubara, 2018. "Price competition or price leadership," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 66(4), pages 1023-1057, December.
   7. Kishimoto, Shin & Watanabe, Naoki & Muto, Shigeo, 2011. "Bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: Asymptotic results in a general Cournot market," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 114-123, March.
   8. Hiroaki Ino, 2010. "Fee Versus Royalties in General Cost functions," Discussion Paper Series 65, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Nov 2010.
   9. Ino Hiroaki & Matsumura Toshihiro, 2016. "Welfare-Improving Effect of a Small Number of Followers in a Stackelberg Model," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 243-265, January.

10. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2008. "A note on selection of proposers in coalitional bargaining," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 37(4), pages 525-532, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Britz, V. & Herings, P.J.J. & Predtetchinski, A., 2012. "On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for endogenous bargaining protocols," Research Memorandum 030, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    2. Montero, M.P., 1999. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Other publications TiSEM 125b271e-7a2b-4123-823d-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
       • Maria Montero, 2023. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 525-548, June.
       • Maria Montero, 2021. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Discussion Papers 2021-05, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
       • Montero, M.P., 1999. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Discussion Paper 1999-121, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Britz, V. & Herings, P.J.J. & Predtetchinski, A., 2014. "Equilibrium delay and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games," Research Memorandum 019, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
       • Volker Britz & P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Arkadi Predtetchinski, 2014. "Equilibrium Delay and Non-existence of Equilibrium in Unanimity Bargaining Games," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 14/196, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    4. BRITZ, Volker & HERINGS, P. Jean-Jacques & PREDTETCHINSKI, Arkadi, 2014. "On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2622, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
       • BRITZ, Volker & HERINGS, Jean-Jacques & PREDTETCHINSKI, Arkadi, 2013. "On the Convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2013044, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
       • Britz, Volker & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2014. "On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for action-dependent bargaining protocols," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 178-183.
    5. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2013. "Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 27-40, January.
    6. Britz, Volker, 2018. "Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 1-20.
    7. Britz, Volker & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2015. "Delay, multiplicity, and non-existence of equilibrium in unanimity bargaining games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 192-202.
    8. Bram Driesen & Peter Eccles & Nora Wegner, 2017. "A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1115-1135, November.

11. Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2008. "A repeated coalitional bargaining model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 292-298, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Okada, Akira & 岡田, 章, 2014. "Cooperation and Institution in Games," Discussion Papers 2014-11, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
       • Akira Okada, 2015. "Cooperation and Institution in Games," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 1-32, March.

12. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2005. "Players' Patience and Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(43), pages 1-5.

    Cited by:

    1. Miller, Luis & Montero, Maria & Vanberg, Christoph, 2018. "Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: Theory and experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 60-92.
       • Luis Miller & Maria Montero & Christoph Vanberg, 2015. "Legislative Bargaining with Heterogeneous Disagreement Values: Theory and Experiments," Discussion Papers 2015-24, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    2. Daniel Cardona & Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2016. "Time-Preference Heterogeneity and Multiplicity of Equilibria in Two-Group Bargaining," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(2), pages 1-17, May.
    3. Hülya Eraslan, 2016. "Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron–Ferejohn model with risk-averse players," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(1), pages 29-40, March.
       • Eraslan, Hulya, 2015. "Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model with Risk Averse Players," Working Papers 15-001, Rice University, Department of Economics.
    4. Maria Montero, 2005. "Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games," Game Theory and Information 0512004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
       • Maria Montero, 2008. "Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(2), pages 125-151, September.
    5. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2013. "Rejecter-proposer legislative bargaining with heterogeneous time and risk preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(1), pages 27-40, January.
    6. Maria Montero, 2015. "A Model of Protocoalition Bargaining with Breakdown Probability," Games, MDPI, vol. 6(2), pages 1-18, April.

13. Kawamori, Tomohiko, 2004. "Uncertainty of time intervals and possibility of collusion in infinitely repeated games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 355-358, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2012. "The Limits of Discrete Time Repeated Games:Some Notes and Comments," Working Papers 2072/203171, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    2. Osório Costa, Antonio Miguel, 2011. "Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions," Working Papers 2072/179668, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.

More information

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-DES: Economic Design (1) 2020-06-29
2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2020-06-29

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