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Vitali Gretschko

Personal Details

First Name:Vitali
Middle Name:
Last Name:Gretschko
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pgr766
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://www.sites.google.com/site/vitaligretschko/?pli=1

Affiliation

(50%) Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)

Mannheim, Germany
http://www.zew.de/
RePEc:edi:zemande (more details at EDIRC)

(50%) Abteilung für Volkswirtschaftslehre
Universität Mannheim

Mannheim, Germany
http://www2.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/
RePEc:edi:fvmande (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Vitali Gretschko & Axel Ockenfels, 2023. "Empfehlungen für das Marktdesign zur Befüllung der Gasspeicher," ECONtribute Policy Brief Series 046, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
  2. Vitali Gretschko & Helene Mass, 2023. "Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_434, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  3. Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim, 2021. "Stellungnahme zu Grundsätzen und Szenarien für die Bereitstellung der Mobilfunkfrequenzen," ZEW Expert Briefs 21-07, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  4. Gretschko, Vitali & Ott, Marion, 2021. "Ein flexibles Vergütungskonzept für Mediziner hilft, Herdenimmunität gegen COVID-19 zu erreichen," ZEW policy briefs 3/2021, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  5. Riehm, Tobias & Fugger, Nicolas & Gillen, Philippe & Gretschko, Vitali & Werner, Peter, 2021. "Social norms and market behavior: Evidence from a large population sample," ZEW Discussion Papers 21-017, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  6. Nicolas Fugger & Vitali Gretschko & Helene Mass & Achim Wambach, 2020. "Imitation Perfection - A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2020_225v2, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  7. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Sequential procurement with limited commitment," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-030, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  8. Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-040, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  9. Gretschko, Vitali & Mass, Helene, 2018. "Endogenous worst-case beliefs in first-price auctions," ZEW Discussion Papers 18-056, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  10. Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim, 2017. "Contract Design With Limited Commitment," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168269, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  11. Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim, 2017. "Contract (re-)negotiation with private and common values," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-056, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
  12. Gretschko, Vitali & Bichler, Martin & Janssen, Maarten, 2016. "Bargaining in Spectrum Auctions: A Review of the German Auction in 2015," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145809, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  13. Gretschko, Vitali & Wambach, Achim, 2015. "Common Values and the Coase Conjecture: Inefficiencies in Frictionless Contract (Re-)Negotiation," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 113064, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  14. Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach, 2012. "Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Case of Favoritism," CESifo Working Paper Series 4045, CESifo.
  15. Vitali Gretschko & Stephan Knapek & Achim Wambach, 2012. "Strategic Complexities in the Combinatorial Clock Auction," CESifo Working Paper Series 3983, CESifo.

Articles

  1. Gretschko, Vitali & Mass, Helene, 2024. "Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
  2. Gretschko Vitali & Ockenfels Axel, 2023. "Empfehlungen für das Marktdesign zur Befüllung der Gasspeicher," Wirtschaftsdienst, Sciendo, vol. 103(2), pages 105-111, February.
  3. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2022. "Information design in sequential procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 79-85.
  4. Riehm, Tobias & Fugger, Nicolas & Gillen, Philippe & Gretschko, Vitali & Werner, Peter, 2022. "Social norms, sanctions, and conditional entry in markets with externalities: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
  5. Vitali Gretschko & Martin Pollrich, 2022. "Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5146-5161, July.
  6. Helene Mass & Nicolas Fugger & Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach, 2020. "Imitation Perfection—A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 189-245, August.
  7. Bichler, Martin & Gretschko, Vitali & Janssen, Maarten, 2017. "Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German auction in 2015," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 325-340.
  8. Philippe Gillen & Vitali Gretschko & Alexander Rasch, 2017. "Pre-auction or post-auction qualification?," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 139-150, October.
  9. Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach, 2016. "Procurement under public scrutiny: auctions versus negotiations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(4), pages 914-934, November.
  10. Vitali Gretschko & Nicolas Fugger & Philippe Gillen, 2016. "Beschaffungskonflikte: Volkswagen und seine Zulieferer [Procurement Conflicts: VW and Its Suppliers]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 96(9), pages 626-627, September.
  11. Vitali Gretschko & Alexander Rajko, 2015. "Excess information acquisition in auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(3), pages 335-355, September.
  12. Gretschko, Vitali & Rasch, Alexander & Wambach, Achim, 2014. "On the strictly descending multi-unit auction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 79-85.
  13. Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach, 2014. "Information acquisition during a descending auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 731-751, April.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Vitali Gretschko & Helene Mass, 2023. "Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_434, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Joseph Feffer, 2024. "Scoring Auctions with Coarse Beliefs," Papers 2410.06150, arXiv.org.

  2. Gretschko, Vitali & Ott, Marion, 2021. "Ein flexibles Vergütungskonzept für Mediziner hilft, Herdenimmunität gegen COVID-19 zu erreichen," ZEW policy briefs 3/2021, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

    Cited by:

    1. Achim Wambach, 2021. "Besseres Marktdesign im Gesundheitswesen," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 101(8), pages 590-593, August.

  3. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Sequential procurement with limited commitment," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-030, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

    Cited by:

    1. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2022. "Information design in sequential procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 79-85.
    2. Francesco Giovannoni & Toomas Hinnosaar, 2022. "Pricing Novel Goods," Papers 2208.04985, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2024.

  4. Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-040, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.

    Cited by:

    1. Matthew J. Walker & Elena Katok & Jason Shachat, 2023. "Trust and Trustworthiness in Procurement Contracts with Retainage," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3492-3515, June.

  5. Gretschko, Vitali & Bichler, Martin & Janssen, Maarten, 2016. "Bargaining in Spectrum Auctions: A Review of the German Auction in 2015," VfS Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145809, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    Cited by:

    1. Kuś, Agnieszka, 2020. "Polish experience from first-ever spectrum auction," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(7).
    2. Bichler, Martin & Paulsen, Per, 2018. "A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 20-40.
    3. Kazumori, Eiichiro & Belch, Yaakov, 2019. "t-Tree: The Tokyo toolbox for large-scale combinatorial auction experiments," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C).
    4. Ashutosh Jha & Debashis Saha, 2022. "Mobile Broadband for Inclusive Connectivity: What Deters the High-Capacity Deployment of 4G-LTE Innovation in India?," Information Systems Frontiers, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 1305-1329, August.

  6. Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach, 2012. "Auctions vs. Negotiations: The Case of Favoritism," CESifo Working Paper Series 4045, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Pavlova, Natalia (Павлова, Наталья) & Meleshkina, Anna (Мелешкина, Анна), 2017. "Anti-Corruption and Protection of Competition [Противодействие Коррупции И Защита Конкуренции]," Working Papers 041707, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.

  7. Vitali Gretschko & Stephan Knapek & Achim Wambach, 2012. "Strategic Complexities in the Combinatorial Clock Auction," CESifo Working Paper Series 3983, CESifo.

    Cited by:

    1. Janssen, Maarten & Karamychev, Vladimir, 2016. "Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 186-207.
    2. Jonathan Levin & Andrzej (Andy) Skrzypacz, 2014. "Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction," Discussion Papers 14-002, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    3. Martin Bichler & Pasha Shabalin & Jürgen Wolf, 2013. "Do core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(4), pages 511-545, December.
    4. Maarten Janssen & Vladimir Karamychev, 2013. "Gaming in Combinatorial Clock Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-027/VII, Tinbergen Institute, revised 16 Dec 2013.

Articles

  1. Gretschko, Vitali & Mass, Helene, 2024. "Worst-case equilibria in first-price auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(1), January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Bichler, Martin & Gretschko, Vitali & Janssen, Maarten, 2017. "Bargaining in spectrum auctions: A review of the German auction in 2015," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 325-340.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Philippe Gillen & Vitali Gretschko & Alexander Rasch, 2017. "Pre-auction or post-auction qualification?," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(2), pages 139-150, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Seres, G. & Pigon, Adam, 2019. "On the Competitive Effects of Screening in Procurement," Discussion Paper 2019-009, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.

  4. Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach, 2016. "Procurement under public scrutiny: auctions versus negotiations," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 47(4), pages 914-934, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2017. "Auctions versus Negotiations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 12, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    2. Huang, Yangguang & Xia, Jijun, 2019. "Procurement auctions under quality manipulation corruption," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 380-399.
    3. Helene Mass & Nicolas Fugger & Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach, 2020. "Imitation Perfection—A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 189-245, August.
    4. Fugger, Nicolas & Gretschko, Vitali & Pollrich, Martin, 2019. "Sequential procurement with limited commitment," ZEW Discussion Papers 19-030, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    5. Qian, Cheng & Anderson, Edward, 2020. "Buyer’s optimal information revelation strategy in procurement auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 283(3), pages 1011-1025.
    6. Vitali Gretschko & Martin Pollrich, 2022. "Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5146-5161, July.

  5. Vitali Gretschko & Nicolas Fugger & Philippe Gillen, 2016. "Beschaffungskonflikte: Volkswagen und seine Zulieferer [Procurement Conflicts: VW and Its Suppliers]," Wirtschaftsdienst, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 96(9), pages 626-627, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Holger Görg & Saskia Mösle & Thieß Petersen & Hartmut Egger & Kemal Kilic & Dalia Marin & Lisandra Flach & Rahel Aichele & Martin Braml & Ralph Wiechers & Thomas Steinwachs & Morris Hosseini & Michael, 2020. "Neustart der Industrie unter dem Einfluss von Covid-19: Wie bereit ist die globale Lieferkette?," ifo Schnelldienst, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 73(05), pages 03-34, May.

  6. Vitali Gretschko & Alexander Rajko, 2015. "Excess information acquisition in auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(3), pages 335-355, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Anouar El Haji & Michal Krawczyk & Marta Sylwestrzak & Ewa Zawojska, 2016. "Time Pressure and Risk Taking in Auctions: A Field Experiment," Framed Field Experiments 00698, The Field Experiments Website.
    2. Aycinena, D & Elbittar, A & Gomberg, A & Rentschler, L, 2020. "Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It’s a matter of timing," Documentos de Trabajo 18358, Universidad del Rosario.
    3. Pëllumb Reshidi & Alessandro Lizzeri & Leeat Yariv & Jimmy Chan & Wing Suen, 2021. "Individual and Collective Information Acquisition: An Experimental Study," CESifo Working Paper Series 9468, CESifo.
    4. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea & Pan, Siqi, 2021. "Costly Information Acquisition in Centralized Matching Markets," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 280, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    5. Yan Chen & Iman YeckehZaare & Ark Fangzhou Zhang, 2018. "Real or bogus: Predicting susceptibility to phishing with economic experiments," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(6), pages 1-18, June.
    6. Ambuehl, Sandro & Li, Shengwu, 2018. "Belief updating and the demand for information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 21-39.
    7. Chen, Yan & He, YingHua, 2021. "Information acquisition and provision in school choice: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    8. Lin Zhang & Yiting Zhao & Yuan Liu & Jinfang Qian, 2021. "Does the Land Price Subsidy Still Exist against the Background of Market Reform of Industrial Land?," Land, MDPI, vol. 10(9), pages 1-31, September.

  7. Gretschko, Vitali & Rasch, Alexander & Wambach, Achim, 2014. "On the strictly descending multi-unit auction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 79-85.

    Cited by:

    1. Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach, 2014. "Information acquisition during a descending auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 731-751, April.
    2. Fabian Ocker & Karl‐Martin Ehrhart & Marion Ott, 2018. "Bidding strategies in Austrian and German balancing power auctions," Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Energy and Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(6), November.
    3. Li, Zhen & Yue, Jinfeng & Kuo, Ching-Chung, 2018. "Design of discrete Dutch auctions with consideration of time," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 265(3), pages 1159-1171.

  8. Vitali Gretschko & Achim Wambach, 2014. "Information acquisition during a descending auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 731-751, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Ninoslav Malekovic & Lazaros Goutas & Juliana Sutanto & Dennis Galletta, 2020. "Regret under different auction designs: the case of English and Dutch auctions," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 30(1), pages 151-161, March.
    2. Leonardo Rezende, 2018. "Mid-auction information acquisition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 65(3), pages 751-780, May.
    3. Vitali Gretschko & Alexander Rajko, 2015. "Excess information acquisition in auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(3), pages 335-355, September.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 14 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (11) 2014-02-02 2016-02-17 2017-11-05 2017-12-11 2017-12-11 2019-01-14 2019-01-21 2019-09-09 2019-10-14 2020-11-30 2023-07-17. Author is listed
  2. NEP-DES: Economic Design (6) 2017-11-05 2017-12-11 2019-01-14 2019-01-21 2019-09-09 2023-07-17. Author is listed
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (5) 2016-02-17 2017-12-11 2019-01-14 2020-11-30 2023-07-17. Author is listed
  4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (4) 2014-02-02 2017-11-05 2017-12-11 2019-09-09
  5. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (3) 2017-11-05 2019-01-21 2021-03-08
  6. NEP-GER: German Papers (2) 2021-05-31 2023-03-20
  7. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (2) 2019-01-14 2020-11-30
  8. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2019-10-14
  9. NEP-CWA: Central and Western Asia (1) 2021-03-08
  10. NEP-EUR: Microeconomic European Issues (1) 2021-03-08
  11. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2021-03-08
  12. NEP-ISF: Islamic Finance (1) 2021-03-08
  13. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2019-10-14
  14. NEP-SOC: Social Norms and Social Capital (1) 2021-03-08

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