Report NEP-DES-2019-01-14

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Andrew Mackenzie & Christian Trudeau, 2021. "On Groves Mechanisms for Costly Inclusion," Working Papers 1901, University of Windsor, Department of Economics.
• Jan Christoph Schlegel, 2018. "Equivalent Choice Functions and Stable Mechanisms," Papers 1812.10326, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2021.
• Tim Roughgarden & Inbal Talgam-Cohen, 2018. "Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design," Papers 1812.11896, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2020.
• Dütting, Paul & Talgam-Cohen, Inbal & Roughgarden, Tim, 2017. "Modularity and greed in double auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 83199, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
• Gretschko, Vitali & Mass, Helene, 2018. "Endogenous worst-case beliefs in first-price auctions," ZEW Discussion Papers 18-056, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
• Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2018. "A Common-Value Auction with State-Dependent Participation," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_063_2018, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
• Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus, 2018. "Bayesian Implementation and Rent Extraction in a Multi-Dimensional Procurement Problem," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 133, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.