Report NEP-DES-2023-07-17

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Alex Teytelboym issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Vitali Gretschko & Helene Mass, 2023. "Worst-Case Equilibria in First-Price Auctions," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_434, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
• Jason Shachat & Lijia Wei, 2023. "Discrete Rule Learning in First Price Auctions," Working Papers 23-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
• Pranjal Rawat, 2023. "Designing Auctions when Algorithms Learn to Bid: The critical role of Payment Rules," Papers 2306.09437, arXiv.org.
• Yurong Chen & Qian Wang & Zhijian Duan & Haoran Sun & Zhaohua Chen & Xiang Yan & Xiaotie Deng, 2023. "Coordinated Dynamic Bidding in Repeated Second-Price Auctions with Budgets," Papers 2306.07709, arXiv.org.
• Bo Young Chang, 2023. "Estimating the Slope of the Demand Function at Auctions for Government of Canada Bonds," Discussion Papers 2023-12, Bank of Canada.
• Labrini Zarpala, 2023. "Auctioning Corporate Bonds: A Uniform-Price under Investment Mandates," Papers 2306.07134, arXiv.org.
• Noelia Juarez & Paola B. Manasero & Jorge Oviedo, 2023. "Nash implementation in a many-to-one matching market," Papers 2305.13956, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2024.
• Eric Kamwa, 2023. "On Two Voting systems that combine approval and preferences: Fallback Voting and Preference Approval Voting," Post-Print hal-03614585, HAL.
• Will Sandholtz & Andrew Tai, 2023. "House-Swapping with Objective Indifferences," Papers 2306.09529, arXiv.org.
• Denizalp Goktas & Jiayi Zhao & Amy Greenwald, 2023. "T\^atonnement in Homothetic Fisher Markets," Papers 2306.04890, arXiv.org.