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Jack Fanning

Personal Details

First Name:Jack
Middle Name:
Last Name:Fanning
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pfa485
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/a/brown.edu/jfanning/home

Affiliation

Economics Department
Brown University

Providence, Rhode Island (United States)
http://www.econ.brown.edu/
RePEc:edi:edbrous (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters

Working papers

  1. Geoffroy de Clippel & Jack Fanning & Kareen Rozen, 2020. "Bargaining over Contingent Contracts Under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2020-13, Brown University, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Geoffroy de Clippel & Jack Fanning & Kareen Rozen, 2022. "Bargaining over Contingent Contracts under Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(5), pages 1522-1554, May.
  2. Jack Fanning & Andrew Kloosterman, 2022. "An experimental test of the Coase conjecture: Fairness in dynamic bargaining," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 138-165, March.
  3. Fanning, Jack, 2022. "Fairness and the Coase conjecture," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
  4. Jack Fanning, 2021. "Mediation in Reputational Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(8), pages 2444-2472, August.
  5. Bernard, Mark & Fanning, Jack & Yuksel, Sevgi, 2018. "Finding cooperators: Sorting through repeated interaction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 76-94.
  6. Fanning, Jack, 2018. "No compromise: Uncertain costs in reputational bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 518-555.
  7. Jack Fanning, 2016. "Reputational Bargaining and Deadlines," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1131-1179, May.

Chapters

  1. Jack Fanning & Alexander Wolitzky, 2022. "Reputational Bargaining," Springer Books, in: Emin Karagözoğlu & Kyle B. Hyndman (ed.), Bargaining, chapter 0, pages 35-60, Springer.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Geoffroy de Clippel & Jack Fanning & Kareen Rozen, 2020. "Bargaining over Contingent Contracts Under Incomplete Information," Working Papers 2020-13, Brown University, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Zhuo Wenjun, 2023. "Circulation Expectations, Farmer Trust, and Farmers’ Contract Choice Behavior," Land, MDPI, vol. 12(8), pages 1-15, August.

Articles

  1. Geoffroy de Clippel & Jack Fanning & Kareen Rozen, 2022. "Bargaining over Contingent Contracts under Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(5), pages 1522-1554, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Jack Fanning & Andrew Kloosterman, 2022. "An experimental test of the Coase conjecture: Fairness in dynamic bargaining," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 138-165, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Helland, Leif & Våge Knutsen, Magnus, 2022. "The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 454-468.
    2. Fanning, Jack, 2022. "Fairness and the Coase conjecture," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).

  3. Fanning, Jack, 2022. "Fairness and the Coase conjecture," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).

    Cited by:

    1. Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Helland, Leif & Våge Knutsen, Magnus, 2022. "The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 454-468.
    2. Burns, Nathaniel A. & Deck, Cary A. & Thomas, Charles J., 2023. "Experimental analysis of impatience in bilateral and multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).

  4. Jack Fanning, 2021. "Mediation in Reputational Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(8), pages 2444-2472, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Gottardi, Piero & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2024. "Shuttle diplomacy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).
    2. Sanktjohanser, Anna, 2022. "Optimally Stubborn," TSE Working Papers 22-1367, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    3. Basak, Deepal, 2023. "Bargaining under almost complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    4. Bonev, Petyo & Matsumoto, Shigeru, 2022. "An empirical evaluation of environmental Alternative Dispute Resolution methods," Economics Working Paper Series 2208, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.

  5. Bernard, Mark & Fanning, Jack & Yuksel, Sevgi, 2018. "Finding cooperators: Sorting through repeated interaction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 76-94.

    Cited by:

    1. Chloe Tergiman & Marie Claire Villeval, 2021. "The Way People Lie in Markets: Detectable vs. Deniable Lies," Working Papers halshs-03512300, HAL.
    2. Dorothée Honhon & Kyle Hyndman, 2020. "Flexibility and Reputation in Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(11), pages 4998-5014, November.
    3. Chloe Tergiman & Marie Claire Villeval, 2019. "The Way People Lie in Markets," Working Papers halshs-02292040, HAL.
    4. Felix Kölle & Simone Quercia & Egon Tripodi, 2023. "Social Preferences under the Shadow of the Future," CESifo Working Paper Series 10534, CESifo.
    5. Serdarevic, Nina & Strømland, Eirik & Tjøtta, Sigve, 2021. "It pays to be nice: The benefits of cooperating in markets," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    6. Sera Linardi & Colin Camerer, 2021. "Worker-firm relational contracts in the time of shutdowns: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(4), pages 1267-1293, December.
    7. Mengel, Friederike & Orlandi, Ludovica & Weidenholzer, Simon, 2022. "Match length realization and cooperation in indefinitely repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    8. Kloosterman, Andrew & Mago, Shakun, 2023. "The infinitely repeated volunteer's dilemma: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 812-832.
    9. Kyle Hyndman & Dorothée Honhon, 2020. "Flexibility in Long-Term Relationships: An Experimental Study," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 22(2), pages 273-291, March.
    10. Kartal, Melis & Müller, Wieland & Tremewan, James, 2021. "Building trust: The costs and benefits of gradualism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 258-275.

  6. Fanning, Jack, 2018. "No compromise: Uncertain costs in reputational bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 518-555.

    Cited by:

    1. Anna Sanktjohanser, 2020. "Optimally Stubborn," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2255, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Sanktjohanser, Anna, 2022. "Optimally Stubborn," TSE Working Papers 22-1367, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    3. Basak, Deepal, 2023. "Bargaining under almost complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).

  7. Jack Fanning, 2016. "Reputational Bargaining and Deadlines," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1131-1179, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Alp Simsek & Muhamet Yildiz, 2016. "Durability, Deadline, and Election Effects in Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 22284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Send, Jonas & Serena, Marco, 2022. "An empirical analysis of insistent bargaining," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    3. Colin F. Camerer & Gideon Nave & Alec Smith, 2019. "Dynamic Unstructured Bargaining with Private Information: Theory, Experiment, and Outcome Prediction via Machine Learning," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(4), pages 1867-1890, April.
    4. Francesc Dilmé, 2021. "The Role of Discounting in Bargaining with One-Sided Offers," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 063, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    5. Karagözoğlu, Emin & Keskin, Kerim, 2018. "Time-varying fairness concerns, delay, and disagreement in bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 115-128.
    6. Emin Karagözoğlu & Martin G. Kocher, 2019. "Bargaining under time pressure from deadlines," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 22(2), pages 419-440, June.
    7. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David G. & Stacchetti, Ennio, 2015. "One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
    8. Mehmet Ekmekci & Hanzhe Zhang, 2021. "Reputational Bargaining with Ultimatum Opportunities," Papers 2105.01581, arXiv.org.
    9. Olivier Bochet & Manshu Khanna & Simon Siegenthaler, 2021. "Beyond the Dividing Pie: Multi-Issue Bargaining in the Laboratory," Working Papers 20210070, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Sep 2021.
    10. Anna Sanktjohanser, 2020. "Optimally Stubborn," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2255, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    11. Giri Parameswaran & Hunter Rendleman, 2022. "Redistribution under general decision rules," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 24(1), pages 159-196, February.
    12. Ortner, Juan, 2023. "Bargaining with evolving private information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
    13. Topi Miettinen & Olli Ropponen & Pekka Sääskilahti, 2020. "Prospect Theory, Fairness, and the Escalation of Conflict at a Negotiation Impasse," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 122(4), pages 1535-1574, October.
    14. Tsoy, Anton, 2018. "Alternating-offer bargaining with the global games information structure," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), May.
    15. Heggedal, Tom-Reiel & Helland, Leif & Våge Knutsen, Magnus, 2022. "The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 454-468.
    16. Sanktjohanser, Anna, 2022. "Optimally Stubborn," TSE Working Papers 22-1367, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    17. Jonas Send & Marco Serena, 2021. "An Empirical Analysis of Stubborn Bargaining," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2021-05, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    18. Bingchao Huangfu & Gagan Ghosh & Heng Liu, 2023. "Resource inequality in the war of attrition," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(1), pages 33-61, March.
    19. Fanning, Jack, 2018. "No compromise: Uncertain costs in reputational bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 518-555.
    20. Marco Serena, 2021. "The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 50(2), pages 377-397, June.
    21. Basak, Deepal, 2023. "Bargaining under almost complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    22. Kim, Wukki & Sandler, Todd, 2021. "Duration and competing-risks determinants of terrorist hostage-taking incidents," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).

Chapters

  1. Jack Fanning & Alexander Wolitzky, 2022. "Reputational Bargaining," Springer Books, in: Emin Karagözoğlu & Kyle B. Hyndman (ed.), Bargaining, chapter 0, pages 35-60, Springer.

    Cited by:

    1. Send, Jonas & Serena, Marco, 2022. "An empirical analysis of insistent bargaining," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    2. Basak, Deepal, 2023. "Bargaining under almost complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Rankings

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  2. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2020-02-24. Author is listed
  2. NEP-DES: Economic Design (1) 2020-02-24. Author is listed
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (1) 2020-02-24. Author is listed
  4. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (1) 2020-02-24. Author is listed
  5. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2020-02-24. Author is listed

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