IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/pdi482.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Deniz Dizdar

Personal Details

First Name:Deniz
Middle Name:
Last Name:Dizdar
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pdi482
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/dizdardeniz/

Affiliation

(50%) Département de Sciences Économiques
Université de Montréal

Montréal, Canada
http://www.sceco.umontreal.ca/
RePEc:edi:demtlca (more details at EDIRC)

(50%) Centre Interuniversitaire de Recherche en Économie Quantitative (CIREQ)

Montréal, Canada
https://cireqmontreal.com/
RePEc:edi:cdmtlca (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Benny Moldovanu & Deniz Dizdar & Nora Szech, 2018. "The Multiplier Effect in Two-Sided Markets With Bilateral Investments," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2018_030, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
  2. Deniz Dizdar & Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu, 2010. "Revenue Maximization in the Dynamic Knapsack Problem," Discussion Paper Series dp544, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

Articles

  1. Eren Bilen & Deniz Dizdar & Chun‐Hui Miao, 2023. "Search less for a better price," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(2), pages 622-646, May.
  2. Dizdar, Deniz, 2021. "On the optimality of small research tournaments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 19-22.
  3. Dizdar, Deniz & Kováč, Eugen, 2020. "A simple proof of strong duality in the linear persuasion problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 407-412.
  4. Dizdar, Deniz & Moldovanu, Benny & Szech, Nora, 2019. "The feedback effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 106-142.
  5. Deniz Dizdar, 2018. "Galichon, Alfred: Optimal transport methods in economics," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 309-312, November.
  6. Deniz Dizdar, 2018. "Two-Sided Investment and Matching with Multidimensional Cost Types and Attributes," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 86-123, August.
  7. Dizdar, Deniz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2016. "On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 106-123.
  8. , & , & ,, 2011. "Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), May.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Deniz Dizdar & Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu, 2010. "Revenue Maximization in the Dynamic Knapsack Problem," Discussion Paper Series dp544, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2024. "Unidirectional Incentive Compatibility," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2024_524, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    2. Mierendorff, Konrad, 2016. "Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 190-222.
    3. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2014. "Dynamic Allocation of Objects to Queuing Agents: The Discrete Model," Post-Print halshs-01109667, HAL.
    4. Jihyeok Jung & Chan-Oi Song & Deok-Joo Lee & Kiho Yoon, 2024. "Optimal Mechanism in a Dynamic Stochastic Knapsack Environment," Papers 2402.14269, arXiv.org.
    5. Jarman, Felix & Meisner, Vincent, 2015. "Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement," Working Papers 15-02, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    6. Dirk Bergemann & Johannes Horner, 2010. "Should Auctions be Transparent?," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1764, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    7. Francis Bloch & David Cantala, 2017. "Dynamic Assignment of Objects to Queuing Agents," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 88-122, February.
    8. Ryuji Sano, 2015. "A Dynamic Mechanism Design for Scheduling with Different Use Lengths," KIER Working Papers 924, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    9. Dinard van der Laan & Zaifu Yang, 2019. "Efficient Sequential Assignments with Randomly Arriving Multi-Item Demand Agents," Discussion Papers 19/13, Department of Economics, University of York.
    10. Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2010. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Discussion Papers 1490, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    11. Ryuji Sano, 2017. "A Dynamic Mechanism Design with Overbooking, Different Deadlines, and Multi-unit Demands," KIER Working Papers 963, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    12. Ensthaler, Ludwig & Giebe, Thomas, 2014. "Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 234(3), pages 774-779.
    13. Gershkov, Alex & Moldovanu, Benny, 2012. "Dynamic allocation and pricing: A mechanism design approach," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 283-286.

Articles

  1. Dizdar, Deniz, 2021. "On the optimality of small research tournaments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 19-22.

    Cited by:

    1. Eren Bilen & Deniz Dizdar & Chun‐Hui Miao, 2023. "Search less for a better price," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(2), pages 622-646, May.

  2. Dizdar, Deniz & Kováč, Eugen, 2020. "A simple proof of strong duality in the linear persuasion problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 407-412.

    Cited by:

    1. Emiliano Catonini & Sergey Stepanov, 2022. "On the optimality of full disclosure," Papers 2202.07944, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2023.
    2. Andreas Kleiner & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(4), pages 1557-1593, July.
    3. Alexander V. Kolesnikov & Fedor Sandomirskiy & Aleh Tsyvinski & Alexander P. Zimin, 2022. "Beckmann's approach to multi-item multi-bidder auctions," Papers 2203.06837, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
    4. Kim, Kyungmin & Koh, Youngwoo, 2022. "Auctions with flexible information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 256-281.
    5. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2023. "Feasible Conditional Belief Distributions," Papers 2307.07672, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
    6. Gregorio Curello & Ludvig Sinander, 2022. "The comparative statics of persuasion," Papers 2204.07474, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    7. Dworczak, Piotr & Kolotilin, Anton, 2024. "The persuasion duality," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 19(4), November.
    8. Kun Zhang, 2022. "Withholding Verifiable Information," Papers 2206.09918, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.

  3. Dizdar, Deniz & Moldovanu, Benny & Szech, Nora, 2019. "The feedback effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 182(C), pages 106-142.

    Cited by:

    1. Sela, Aner, 2020. "Two-Stage Matching Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 14610, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Aner Sela, 2023. "All-Pay Matching Contests," Working Papers 2313, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    3. Sela, Aner, 2020. "Assortative Matching Contests," CEPR Discussion Papers 14598, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Chen Cohen & Ishay Rabi & Aner Sela, 2022. "Assortative Matching by Lottery Contests," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(5), pages 1-20, September.
    5. Zhang, Hanzhe, 2020. "Pre-matching gambles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 76-89.

  4. Deniz Dizdar, 2018. "Two-Sided Investment and Matching with Multidimensional Cost Types and Attributes," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 86-123, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Nöldeke, Georg & Samuelson, Larry, 2014. "Investment and Competitive Matching," Working papers 2014/07, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    2. Dizdar, Deniz & Moldovanu, Benny & Szech, Nora, 2017. "The multiplier effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments," Working Paper Series in Economics 109, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    3. moldovanu, benny, 2018. "The Feedback Effect in Two-Sided Markets with Bilateral Investments," CEPR Discussion Papers 13258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Seungjin Han, 2019. "Pre-Match Investment Competition with Bounded Transfers," Department of Economics Working Papers 2019-01, McMaster University.
    5. Elliott, M. & Talamàs, E., 2020. "Bargaining Foundations for Price Taking in Matching Markets," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 2070, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    6. Thomas Gall, 2017. "Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching markets with nontransferabilities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(1), pages 51-78, March.
    7. Michael Greinecker & Christopher Kah, 2021. "Pairwise Stable Matching in Large Economies," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(6), pages 2929-2974, November.
    8. Zhang, Hanzhe, 2020. "Pre-matching gambles," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 76-89.

  5. Dizdar, Deniz & Moldovanu, Benny, 2016. "On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 106-123.

    Cited by:

    1. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2018. "Restricted Environments and Incentive Compatibility in Interdependent Values Models," Working Papers 1024, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Daniel Fershtman & Alessandro Pavan, 2022. "Matching auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 32-62, March.

  6. , & , & ,, 2011. "Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 6(2), May.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 5 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (3) 2018-01-01 2018-03-12 2019-01-28
  2. NEP-DES: Economic Design (3) 2018-01-01 2018-03-12 2019-01-28
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (3) 2018-01-01 2018-03-12 2019-01-28
  4. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2018-01-01 2018-03-12 2019-01-28
  5. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (1) 2010-06-11

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Deniz Dizdar should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.