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Elaine Tan

Personal Details

First Name:Elaine
Middle Name:
Last Name:Tan
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pta184

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Royal Holloway

Egham, United Kingdom
http://rhul.ac.uk/Economics/
RePEc:edi:derhbuk (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Normann, Hans-Theo & Tan, Elaine S., 2013. "Effects of different cartel policies: Evidence from the German power-cable industry," DICE Discussion Papers 108, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

Articles

  1. Elaine Tan, 2011. "Scrip as private money, monetary monopoly, and the rent‐seeking state in Britain," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 64(1), pages 237-255, February.
  2. Elaine S. Tan, 2009. "Market structure and the coal cartel in early nineteenth‐century England1," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 62(2), pages 350-365, May.
  3. Elaine S. Tan, 2006. "Regulating Wages in Kind: Theory and Evidence from Britain," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 442-458, October.
  4. Tan, Elaine S., 2005. "Ideology, interest groups, and institutional change: the case of the British prohibition of wages in kind," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 175-191, December.
  5. Tan, Elaine S., 2002. "'The bull is half the herd': property rights and enclosures in England, 1750-1850," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 470-489, October.
  6. E.S. Tan & A.W. Ambergen & R.J.M.M. Does & Tj. Imbos, 1999. "Approximations of Normal IRT Models for Change," Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, , vol. 24(2), pages 208-223, June.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Normann, Hans-Theo & Tan, Elaine S., 2013. "Effects of different cartel policies: Evidence from the German power-cable industry," DICE Discussion Papers 108, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).

    Cited by:

    1. Muthers, Johannes & Hunold, Matthias, 2017. "Capacity constrained price competition with transportation costs," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168248, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Simon Martin & Wolfgang Benedikt Schmal, 2021. "Collusive Compensation Schemes Aided by Algorithms," CESifo Working Paper Series 9481, CESifo.
    3. Fischer, Christian & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2018. "Collusion and bargaining in asymmetric Cournot duopoly: An experiment," DICE Discussion Papers 283, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), revised 2018.

Articles

  1. Elaine S. Tan, 2009. "Market structure and the coal cartel in early nineteenth‐century England1," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 62(2), pages 350-365, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Peter M. Solar & Oliver Buxton Dunn & Aidan Kane, 2024. "Shipping in the London coal trade, 1700‒1860," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 77(3), pages 1005-1034, August.
    2. John E. Murray & Javier Silvestre, 2020. "Integration in European coal markets, 1833–1913," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 73(3), pages 668-702, August.
    3. Indrajit Ray, 2015. "Dynamics of Bengal coal mining in the nineteenth century: Dissemination of mineralogical knowledge and railway networking," The Indian Economic & Social History Review, , vol. 52(4), pages 463-499, October.
    4. Andrea Günster & Stephen Martin, 2015. "A Holy Alliance: Collusion in the Renaissance Europe Alum Market," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 47(1), pages 1-23, August.

  2. Elaine S. Tan, 2006. "Regulating Wages in Kind: Theory and Evidence from Britain," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 442-458, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Elaine Tan, 2011. "Scrip as private money, monetary monopoly, and the rent‐seeking state in Britain," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 64(1), pages 237-255, February.

  3. Tan, Elaine S., 2005. "Ideology, interest groups, and institutional change: the case of the British prohibition of wages in kind," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 175-191, December.

    Cited by:

    1. DEMPSTER Gregory & KLUVER Jesse, 2019. "Institutional Entrepreneurship In Health Management: A Survey Experiment On Appreciative Inquiry®," Studies in Business and Economics, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 14(1), pages 34-50, April.
    2. Ruttan, Vernon W., 2008. "Induced Technical Change, Induced Institutional Change and Mechanism Design," Staff Papers 7050, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    3. Karim Khan, 2013. "Distributive consideration in institutional change: the case of Zia’s Islamization policy in Pakistan," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 139-165, June.
    4. Elaine Tan, 2011. "Scrip as private money, monetary monopoly, and the rent‐seeking state in Britain," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 64(1), pages 237-255, February.

  4. Tan, Elaine S., 2002. "'The bull is half the herd': property rights and enclosures in England, 1750-1850," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 470-489, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Studer, Roman, 2008. "India and the Great Divergence: Assessing the Efficiency of Grain Markets in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century India," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(2), pages 393-437, June.
    2. Jane Humphries & Tim Leunig, 2007. "Cities, Market Integration and Going to Sea: Stunting and the Standard of Living in Early Nineteenth-Century England and Wales," Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers _066, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    3. Paul Sharp & Jacob Weisdorf, 2007. "From Preventive to Permissive Checks: The changing nature of the Malthusian relationship between nuptiality and the price of provisions in the nineteenth century," Discussion Papers 07-20, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    4. Guillaume Daudin, 2008. "Domestic Trade and Market Size in Late Eighteenth-Century France," Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers _069, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    5. Alexandre Debs, 2003. "The Source of Walras`s Idealist Bias: A Review of Koppl`s Solution to the Walras Paradox," Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers _049, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    6. James Malcomson & Martin Chalkley & University of Dundee, 2001. "Cost Sharing in Health Service Provision: An Empirical Assessment of Cost Savings," Economics Series Working Papers 69, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    7. Robert Dryburgh, 2003. "Individual, Illegal, and Unjust Purposes`: Overseers, Incentives, and the Old Poor Law in Bolton, 1820-1837," Oxford Economic and Social History Working Papers _050, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    8. David Stead, 2004. "Risk and risk management in English agriculture, c. 1750–1850," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 57(2), pages 334-361, May.

  5. E.S. Tan & A.W. Ambergen & R.J.M.M. Does & Tj. Imbos, 1999. "Approximations of Normal IRT Models for Change," Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, , vol. 24(2), pages 208-223, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Yang Liu & Xiaojing Wang, 2020. "Bayesian Nonparametric Monotone Regression of Dynamic Latent Traits in Item Response Theory Models," Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, , vol. 45(3), pages 274-296, June.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2013-10-11
  2. NEP-LAW: Law and Economics (1) 2013-10-11
  3. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2013-10-11

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