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Distributive consideration in institutional change: the case of Zia’s Islamization policy in Pakistan

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  • Karim Khan

Abstract

Institutional change is an interactive process that results from the social interactions of economic actors. Several perspectives like ideology, efficiency, or distribution etc. are relevant in studying institutional change. In this paper, the distributive consideration is analyzed and an argument is made in favor of this approach by providing evidence from Pakistan’s Islamization policy. Our analysis shows that Zia’s Islamization program was motivated by his search for legitimacy, and his rent-seeking interests. Domestic legitimacy was achieved through the introduction of Islamic clauses in the constitution as it was a popular demand in a state which was already established through a religious rhetoric. The Islamization program also helped in attaining international legitimacy as the religious circles informally initiated Jihad against Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The Islamization policy and Jihad, in turn, resulted in windfall gains in the form of US economic and military assistance that led to a voracious rent-seeking in the Pakistani society. After the detailed descriptive analysis, we model this situation in two-stage rent-seeking activities. We show how the rent-seeking contest among various interest groups results in institutional change as an equilibrium outcome. Our results indicate that Pakistan’s Islamization program is associated with the parameter shifts in our model. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

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  • Karim Khan, 2013. "Distributive consideration in institutional change: the case of Zia’s Islamization policy in Pakistan," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 139-165, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:24:y:2013:i:2:p:139-165
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-013-9136-9
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    1. repec:eur:ejserj:41111 is not listed on IDEAS
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    3. Khan, Karim, 2019. "Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and Prospects for the Domestic Economy of Pakistan," MPRA Paper 103337, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Adeel Malik & Rinchan Ali Mirza & Faiz Ur Rehman, 2023. "Frontier governmentality," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2023-42, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    5. Faiz Ur Rehman, 2019. "The Production of Terrorism in Pakistan: A Religious Market Explanation," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 58(3), pages 283-305.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Institutional change; Distributive consideration; Zia’s Islamization program; Interest groups; US military and economic assistance; O53; P16; E02; O43; N45;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O53 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State
    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • O43 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Institutions and Growth
    • N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East

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