IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/e/poz14.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Ipek Ozkal-Sanver

Personal Details

First Name:Ipek
Middle Name:
Last Name:Ozkal-Sanver
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:poz14
http://www.bilgi.edu.tr/pages/faculties.asp?keepO=4&stuffid=336&fid=2&did=5&r=8%2F13%2F2005+1

Affiliation

(in no particular order)

İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi (Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences)
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi (Istanbul Bilgi University)

İstanbul, Turkey
http://www.bilgi.edu.tr/tr/programlar-ve-okullar/lisans/iktisadi-ve-idari-bilimler-fakultesi/
RePEc:edi:deibitr (more details at EDIRC)

Murat Sertel İleri İktisadi Araştırmalar Merkezi (Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies)
İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi (Istanbul Bilgi University)

İstanbul, Turkey
http://mscenter.bilgi.edu.tr/
RePEc:edi:msbiltr (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Articles

Articles

  1. Doruk İriş & İpek Özkal-Sanver, 2011. "Manilulation via endowments in university-admission problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(4), pages 2952-2958.
  2. Duygu Nizamogullari & İpek Özkal-Sanver, 2011. "Coalitional stability and efficiency of partitions in matching problems," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(3), pages 395-407, September.
  3. İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Sanver, 2010. "A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(3), pages 439-452, September.
  4. Murat Sertel & İpek Özkal-Sanver, 2007. "The Manipulability of Matching Rules via Segmentation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 30(3), pages 473-491, March.
  5. İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Sanver, 2006. "Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 211-219, August.
  6. İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Sanver, 2006. "Nash implementation via hyperfunctions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 607-623, June.
  7. İpek Özkal-Sanver, 2005. "Stability and Efficiency of Partitions in Matching Problems," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 193-205, November.
  8. Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek & Remzi Sanver, M., 2005. "Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 304-317, November.
  9. Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek, 2004. "A note on gender fairness in matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 211-217, March.
  10. Sertel, Murat R. & Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek, 2002. "Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 65-83, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Articles

  1. Doruk İriş & İpek Özkal-Sanver, 2011. "Manilulation via endowments in university-admission problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(4), pages 2952-2958.

    Cited by:

    1. Muto, Nozomu & Shirata, Yasuhiro, 2017. "Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 75-84.

  2. İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Sanver, 2010. "A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 69(3), pages 439-452, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Weibin Han & Adrian Deemen, 2019. "A refinement of the uncovered set in tournaments," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(1), pages 107-121, February.

  3. İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Sanver, 2006. "Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 211-219, August.

    Cited by:

    1. David S. Ahn & Santiago Oliveros, 2010. "Combinatorial Voting," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000263, David K. Levine.
    2. Grandi, Umberto & Lang, Jérôme & Ozkes, Ali & Airiau, Stéphane, 2020. "Voting behavior in one-shot and iterative multiple referenda," SocArXiv y4m6r, Center for Open Science.
    3. Fatma Aslan & Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2021. "When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?," Post-Print hal-03335584, HAL.
    4. Jean Lainé & Ali Ihsan Ozkes & Remzi Sanver, 2016. "Hyper-stable social welfare functions," Post-Print hal-01505809, HAL.
    5. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2014. "Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 22(2), pages 784-799, July.
    6. Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022. "Compromise in combinatorial vote," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 175-206, July.
    7. Lang, Jrme & Xia, Lirong, 2009. "Sequential composition of voting rules in multi-issue domains," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 304-324, May.
    8. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Kornhauser, Lewis A., 2010. "Only a dictatorship is efficient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 261-270, November.
    9. Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2012. "Searching for a Compromise in Multiple Referendum," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 551-569, July.
    10. Tuğçe Çuhadaroğlu & Jean Lainé, 2012. "Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(4), pages 525-536, April.
    11. Hayrullah Dindar & Gilbert Laffond & Jean Lainé, 2021. "Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 191-220, February.

  4. İpek Özkal-Sanver & M. Sanver, 2006. "Nash implementation via hyperfunctions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(3), pages 607-623, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," Post-Print hal-03498370, HAL.
    2. Emre Doğan & M. Sanver, 2008. "Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 495-506, April.
    3. Yi, Jianxin, 2011. "Implementation via mechanisms with transfers," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 65-70, January.
    4. M. Remzi Sanver, 2018. "Implementing Pareto Optimal and Individually Rational Outcomes by Veto," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 223-233, April.

  5. İpek Özkal-Sanver, 2005. "Stability and Efficiency of Partitions in Matching Problems," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 193-205, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Duygu Nizamogullari & İpek Özkal-Sanver, 2011. "Coalitional stability and efficiency of partitions in matching problems," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 71(3), pages 395-407, September.

  6. Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek, 2004. "A note on gender fairness in matching problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 211-217, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Litsa Alexandra & Maguet Jean-François, 2012. "College Choice Mechanism: The Respect of the Vagueness of Choices," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen) 201202, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS.
    2. Daniela Bubboloni & Michele Gori & Claudia Meo, 2024. "Resolute and symmetric mechanisms for two-sided matching problems," Papers 2404.01404, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2024.
    3. Bettina Klaus, 2013. "Consistency and its Converse for Roommate Markets," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 13.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.

  7. Sertel, Murat R. & Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek, 2002. "Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 65-83, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Murat Atlamaz & Bettina Klaus, 2003. "Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 598.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    2. S. Akin & Brennan Platt & Murat Sertel, 2011. "The n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 15(2), pages 147-162, June.
    3. S. Nuray Akin & Murat R. Sertel, 2007. "The Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution Manipulated by Pre-Donations is Concessionary," Working Papers 0718, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
    4. Dimitrov, D. & Haake, C.J. & Klaus, B.E., 2005. "Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods," Research Memorandum 028, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    5. Afacan, Mustafa Oǧuz, 2013. "Application fee manipulations in matching markets," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 446-453.
    6. de Regt, E.R., 2005. "Overtime and short-time with fluctuating absenteeism and demand," Research Memorandum 027, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    7. Dimitrov, Dinko & Haake, Claus-Jochen, 2011. "Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 367, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    8. Hüber, Frank, 2011. "Manipulationsanreize im Gale-Shapley-Algorithmus: Ein Literaturüberblick," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2011-203, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    9. Muto, Nozomu & Shirata, Yasuhiro, 2017. "Manipulation via endowments in auctions with multiple goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 75-84.
    10. Schummer, James & Abizada, Azar, 2017. "Incentives in landing slot problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 170(C), pages 29-55.
    11. Doruk İriş & İpek Özkal-Sanver, 2011. "Manilulation via endowments in university-admission problem," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(4), pages 2952-2958.
    12. Fiestras-Janeiro, Gloria & Klijn, Flip & Sanchez, Estela, 2004. "Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 295-312, May.
    13. Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek & Remzi Sanver, M., 2005. "Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 304-317, November.
    14. Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma, 2018. "Endowments-swapping-proof house allocation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 187-202.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

Featured entries

This author is featured on the following reading lists, publication compilations, Wikipedia, or ReplicationWiki entries:
  1. Turkish Economists

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Ipek Ozkal-Sanver should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.