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Monopsony in Law and Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Blair,Roger D.
  • Harrison,Jeffrey L.

Abstract

Most readers are familiar with the concept of a monopoly. A monopolist is the only seller of a good or service for which there are not good substitutes. Economists and policy makers are concerned about monopolies because they lead to higher prices and lower output. The topic of this book is monopsony, the economic condition in which there is one buyer of a good or service. It is a common misunderstanding that if monopolists raise prices, then monopsonists must lower them. It is true that a monopsonist may force sellers to sell to them at lower prices, but this does not mean consumers are better off as a result. This book explains why monopsonists can be harmful and the way law has developed to respond to these harms.

Suggested Citation

  • Blair,Roger D. & Harrison,Jeffrey L., 2010. "Monopsony in Law and Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521746083.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:cbooks:9780521746083
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Roger D. Blair & Wenche Wang, 2018. "The NCAA Cartel and Antitrust Policy," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 52(2), pages 351-368, March.
    2. David VanHoose, 2013. "Implications of Shifting Retail Market Shares for Loan Monitoring in a Dominant-Bank Model," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 60(3), pages 291-316, July.
    3. Scalco, Paulo R. & Lopez, Rigoberto A. & He, Xi, 2017. "Stochastic Frontier Estimation of Buyer Power: An Application to the Brazilian Milk Market," 2017 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 1, Chicago, Illinois 259154, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    4. Philip Watson & Jason Winfree, 2022. "Should we use antitrust policies on big agriculture?," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 44(3), pages 1313-1326, September.
    5. Roger D. Blair & Christina DePasquale, 2020. "Monopsony and two‐part tariffs," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(5), pages 730-734, July.
    6. Ngeleza Guyslain K. & Robinson Elizabeth J.Z., 2013. "Cartels and Rent Sharing at the Farmer–Trader Interface: Evidence from Ghana’s Tomato Sector," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 15-30, January.
    7. Geloso, Vincent & Kufenko, Vadim & Arsenault-Morin, Alex P., 2023. "The lesser shades of labor coercion: The impact of seigneurial tenure in nineteenth-century Quebec," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    8. Roger Blair & Christina DePasquale, 2011. "Considerations of Countervailing Power," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 39(1), pages 137-143, August.
    9. Xavier Méra, 2017. "Monopsony Theory Revisited," Post-Print halshs-01519191, HAL.
    10. Herbert Hovenkamp, 2011. "Coasean markets," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 63-90, February.
    11. Arsenault Morin, Alex & Geloso, Vincent & Kufenko, Vadim, 2016. "Monopsony and industrial development in nineteenth century Quebec: The impact of seigneurial tenure," Violette Reihe: Schriftenreihe des Promotionsschwerpunkts "Globalisierung und Beschäftigung" 51/2016, University of Hohenheim, Carl von Ossietzky University Oldenburg, Evangelisches Studienwerk.
    12. Lakshmi Balasubramanyan, 2014. "Differential Capital Requirements: Leverage Ratio versus Risk-Based Capital Ratio from a Monitoring Perspective," Working Papers (Old Series) 1415, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

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