IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/zbw/iprjir/214055.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Standard form contracts and a smart contract future

Author

Listed:
  • Cornelius, Kristin B.

Abstract

With a budding market of widespread smart contract implementation on the horizon, there is much conversation about how to regulate this new technology. Discourse on standard form contracts (SFCs) and how they have been adopted in a digital environment is useful toward predicting how smart contracts might be interpreted. This essay provides a critical review of the discourse surrounding digitised SFCs and applies it to issues in smart contract regulation. An exploration of the literature surrounding specific instances SFCs finds that it lacks a close examination of the textual and documentary aspects of SFCs, which are particularly important in a digital environment as a shift in medium prompts a different procedural process. Instead, common perspectives are either based on outdated notions of paper versions of these contracts or on ideologies of industry and business that do not sufficiently address the needs of consumers/users in the digital age. Most importantly, noting the failure of contract law to address the inequities of SFCs in this environment can help prevent them from being codified further with smart contracts.

Suggested Citation

  • Cornelius, Kristin B., 2018. "Standard form contracts and a smart contract future," Internet Policy Review: Journal on Internet Regulation, Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society (HIIG), Berlin, vol. 7(2), pages 1-18.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:iprjir:214055
    DOI: 10.14763/2018.2.790
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/214055/1/IntPolRev-2018-2-790.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.14763/2018.2.790?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, "undated". "Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1011, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alan Schwartz, 2004. "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 20(1), pages 2-31, April.
    2. Nicola Gennaioli & Enrico Perotti, 2009. "Standardized enforcement: Access to justice vs contractual innovation," Economics Working Papers 1329, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jun 2012.
    3. Manuel Willington, 2013. "Hold Up Under Costly Litigation and Imperfect Courts of Law," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(5), pages 1023-1055, October.
    4. Steffen Altmann & Armin Falk & Paul Heidhues & Rajshri Jayaraman & Marrit Teirlinck, 2019. "Defaults and Donations: Evidence from a Field Experiment," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 101(5), pages 808-826, December.
    5. Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2016. "Incentive Provision when Contracting is Costly," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 83(332), pages 741-767, October.
    6. Armelle Mazé & Claude Ménard, 2010. "Private Ordering, Collective Action, and the Self-Enforcing Range of Contracts. The Case of French Livestock Industry," Post-Print halshs-00624288, HAL.
    7. Nicola Gennaioli & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, 2015. "Optimally vague contracts and the law," Economics Working Papers 1410, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2017.
    8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 807-816, September.
    9. Anderlini Luca & Felli Leonardo & Postlewaite Andrew, 2011. "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 14-28, February.
    10. Marian Moszoro & Pablo T. Spiller & Sebastian Stolorz, 2016. "Rigidity of Public Contracts," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(3), pages 396-427, September.
    11. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 315-329, October.
    12. Peter Mankowski, "undated". "Kommentar zu Georg von Wangenheim: Wie kommt es zu umfangreichem Sozialschutz im Zivilrecht?," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2004-1-1096, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    13. Wu, Steven Y., 2006. "Contract theory and agricultural policy analysis: a discussion and survey of recent developments," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 50(4), pages 1-20, December.
    14. Marcio Iorio Aranha, 2016. "Telecommunications Regulatory Design in Brazil: Networking around State Capacity Deficits," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2016(2), pages 83-105.
    15. Azmat Gani, 2018. "Contract Enforcement and Trade," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 107-119, March.
    16. Vlad Radoias & Simon J. Wilkie & Michael A. Williams, 2017. "Rules of evidence and liability in contract litigation: The efficiency of the General Dynamics rule," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 19(6), pages 1139-1150, December.
    17. Jacobi, Osnat & Weiss, Avi, 2013. "The effect of time on default remedies for breach of contract," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 13-25.
    18. Peter Cserne, "undated". "Freedom of choice and paternalism in contract law: a law and economics perspective," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1139, Berkeley Electronic Press.
    19. Roberto Ippoliti & Alessandro Melcarne & Giovanni Ramello, 2015. "Judicial efficiency and entrepreneurs’ expectations on the reliability of European legal systems," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 75-94, August.
    20. Yair Listokin, 2010. "Bayesian Contractual Interpretation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 359-374.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:iprjir:214055. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://policyreview.info/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.