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A reconsideration of multiple equilibria in the analysis of one-period government bonds with default risk

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  • Guo, Yanling

Abstract

In this paper, the author considers sovereign debt in the form of one-period government bonds with default risk, which can be purchased by and traded among domestic and foreign investors. She shows that the "good equilibrium" is the only stable equilibrium under some quite general assumptions, while the "bad equilibrium" is an unstable one - a possible explanation for why the former is observed in practice. Given the "good equilibrium", the author further shows that the domestic debt share also determines the default risk: a higher domestic debt share means a lower default risk, ceteris paribus, which leads to a lower risk premium; while a lower domestic debt share means a higher default risk and a higher risk premium. Finally, she discusses some alternative interpretations of the domestic debt share.

Suggested Citation

  • Guo, Yanling, 2015. "A reconsideration of multiple equilibria in the analysis of one-period government bonds with default risk," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 9, pages 1-52.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ifweej:201533
    DOI: 10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2015-33
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    public debt; sovereign debt; sovereign default; domestic debt; external debt; fiscal policy; government bond; government borrowing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
    • H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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