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Weltumweltpolitik und ökonomische Theorie

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  • Helm, Carsten

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  • Helm, Carsten, 1996. "Weltumweltpolitik und ökonomische Theorie," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, pages 266-287.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:122362
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    1. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
    2. Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, 1995. "Case-Based Decision Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 605-639.
    3. Costanza, Robert, 1989. "What is ecological economics?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 1-7, February.
    4. Toth, Ferenc L, 1995. "Discounting in integrated assessments of climate change," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4-5), pages 403-409.
    5. Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, 1993. "Global Environmental Risks," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 65-86, Fall.
    6. Henk Folmer & Pierre Mouche & Shannon Ragland, 1993. "Interconnected games and international environmental problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(4), pages 313-335, August.
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