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Polanyi in the European Single Market: The Re-Regulation of Insurance

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  • Mabbett, Deborah

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  • Mabbett, Deborah, 2015. "Polanyi in the European Single Market: The Re-Regulation of Insurance," economic sociology. perspectives and conversations, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, vol. 17(1), pages 25-31.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:econso:156064
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December.
    2. Robert Hudson, 2007. "Mortality projections and unisex pricing of annuities in the UK," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 15(2), pages 166-179, May.
    3. Paul MacDonnell, 2005. "Equal Treatment Directive Misunderstands Risk And Threatens Insurance Markets," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 48-52, March.
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