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Quantitative evaluation of veto power

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  • Chessa Michela
  • Vito Fragnelli

Abstract

The decisiveness index and the loose protectionism index for a single player have been intro- duced, starting from the decisiveness and the loose protectionism indices for a collective decision- making mechanism defined by Carreras. Attention was mainly focused on the latter index, being pro- posed as a quantitative measure of the power of veto of each agent. According to this index, a veto player has veto power equal to one, while each other player has a fractional power according to her/his likelihood of blocking a given proposal. Such an index coincides with the expected payoff at the Bayesian equilibrium of a suitable Bayesian game, which illustrates the non-cooperative point of view of a decision-making mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Chessa Michela & Vito Fragnelli, 2011. "Quantitative evaluation of veto power," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 21(3-4), pages 5-19.
    • Handle: RePEc:wut:journl:v:3-4:y:2011:p:5-19:id:1012
    DOI: 10.5277/ord1203-0401
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Michela Chessa & Vito Fragnelli, 2022. "The Italian referendum: what can we get from game theory?," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 318(2), pages 849-869, November.

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