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Restrictions on Allocation Discretion: Evidence from Clawbacks in Hong Kong IPOs

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  • Emmanuel Morales-Camargo

    (College of Business Administration, University of Texas Arlington, USA)

Abstract

The presence of both restricted and unrestricted, US-style, bookbuilt initial public offer (IPOs) in Hong Kong provides an ideal environment to test numerous underpricing models by simultaneously measuring the effects of allocation restrictions on the investment bankers' price discovery, underwriting, and distribution functions. While clawbacks, a set of allocation restrictions favoring retail investors not participating in the roadshow result in diminished and more expensive price discovery, they also reduce the investment bankers' dependence on institutional investors to dispose off IPO shares, resulting in lower underpricing. This favors models that highlight the importance of the underwriting function on underpricing, and shows that allocation restrictions can impact more than just price discovery. In addition, this study shows that individual investors can partially offset the loss of roadshow information caused by clawbacks, countering the idea that investment banks are unable to extract any pricing information from investors outside their list of roadshow regulars.

Suggested Citation

  • Emmanuel Morales-Camargo, 2013. "Restrictions on Allocation Discretion: Evidence from Clawbacks in Hong Kong IPOs," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 3(03n04), pages 1-57.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:qjfxxx:v:03:y:2013:i:03n04:n:s2010139213500183
    DOI: 10.1142/S2010139213500183
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ravi Jagannathan & Andrei Jirnyi & Ann Sherman, 2010. "Why Don't Issuers Choose IPO Auctions? The Complexity of Indirect Mechanisms," NBER Working Papers 16214, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    IPOs; bookbuilding; allocation policy; underpricing; underwriting; JEL Classification: G14; JEL Classification: G15; JEL Classification: G24; JEL Classification: G32;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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