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Post-Macroeconomics: Lessons From The Crisis And Strategic Directions Ahead

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  • CÉLESTIN MONGA

    (World Bank, 1818 H street, NW Washington DC, 20433, USA)

Abstract

The global crisis has not invalidated everything about macroeconomics. However, it has highlighted some of mistakes of the discipline's dominant intellectual framework. Post-macroeconomic thinking recommended in this paper should not be understood as anothermetanarrativeof the end ofmetanarratives. The use of the prefixposthere suggests and emphasises much more than temporal posterity. Post-macroeconomics should followfrommacroeconomics more than it followsaftermacroeconomics. The theorising of post-macroeconomics is therefore neither systematically oppositional, nor hegemonic. It does not advocate a "dialectic opposition" between macroeconomics and post-macroeconomics. Rather, it suggests that the latter builds on the former and goes beyond it.

Suggested Citation

  • Célestin Monga, 2011. "Post-Macroeconomics: Lessons From The Crisis And Strategic Directions Ahead," Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy (JICEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 2(02), pages 277-304.
  • Handle: RePEc:wsi:jicepx:v:02:y:2011:i:02:n:s1793993311000312
    DOI: 10.1142/S1793993311000312
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "CENTRAL BANK STRATEGY, CREDIBILITY, AND INDEPENDANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE: Compte Rendu par Dominique Cariofillo," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 581-590, December.
    4. Perotti, Roberto, 2007. "Fiscal policy in developing countries : a framework and some questions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4365, The World Bank.
    5. Alex Cukierman, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031981, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Monga Célestin, 2017. "Working Paper 261 - Post-Macroeconomics: Some Theoretical and Analytical Issues," Working Paper Series 2372, African Development Bank.
    2. Monga, Celestin, 2013. "The mechanics of job creation : seizing the new dividends of globalization," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6661, The World Bank.

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