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Optimal Strategies in Best-Choice Game with Incomplete Information — The Voice Show

Author

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  • Vladimir V. Mazalov

    (Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Centre, Russian Academy of Sciences, 11, Pushkinskaya str., Petrozavodsk 185910, Russia)

  • Anna A. Ivashko

    (Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Centre, Russian Academy of Sciences, 11, Pushkinskaya str., Petrozavodsk 185910, Russia)

  • Elena N. Konovalchikova

    (Transbaikal State University, 30, Alexandro-Zavodskaya str., Chita 672039, Russia)

Abstract

This paper studies a game-theoretic model of best choice with incomplete information. In this model, players observe a sequence of incoming objects each described by two random quality components. The first component is announced to players and the other one is hidden. Players choose an object based on known information about it. The winner is the player having a higher sum of the quality components than the opponents do. The optimal strategies of the players and their payoffs in the game are derived.

Suggested Citation

  • Vladimir V. Mazalov & Anna A. Ivashko & Elena N. Konovalchikova, 2016. "Optimal Strategies in Best-Choice Game with Incomplete Information — The Voice Show," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(02), pages 1-18, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:18:y:2016:i:02:n:s0219198916400016
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198916400016
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Minoru Sakaguchi & Vladimir V. Mazalov, 2004. "A non-zero-sum no-information best-choice game," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 60(3), pages 437-451, December.
    2. Vladimir Mazalov & Anna Falko, 2008. "Nash Equilibrium In Two-Sided Mate Choice Problem," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(04), pages 421-435.
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