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Nash Equilibrium In Two-Sided Mate Choice Problem

Author

Listed:
  • VLADIMIR MAZALOV

    (Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center of RAS, Petrozavodsk, 185910, Russia)

  • ANNA FALKO

    (Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center of RAS, Petrozavodsk, 185910, Russia)

Abstract

We consider a two-sided search model in which individuals from two distinct populations would like to form a long-term relationship with a member of the other population. The individual choice is determined by the quality of the partner. Initially the quality of individuals in the population is uniform. At every stage the individuals randomly matched from their populations recognize the quality of the partner. If they accept each other they create a couple and leave the game. The partner's quality is the payoff. Unmatched players go to the next stage. At the last stage the individuals accept any partner. Each player aims to maximize her/his expected payoff. In this paper explicit formulas for Nash equilibrium strategies are derived. Also, the model with incoming individuals is analyzed.

Suggested Citation

  • Vladimir Mazalov & Anna Falko, 2008. "Nash Equilibrium In Two-Sided Mate Choice Problem," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(04), pages 421-435.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:04:n:s0219198908002023
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198908002023
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alpern, Steve & Katrantzi, Ioanna & Ramsey, David, 2014. "Equilibrium population dynamics when mating is by mutual choice based on age," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 63-72.
    2. Alpern, S. & Katrantzi, I. & Ramsey, D.M., 2013. "Partnership formation with age-dependent preferences," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 225(1), pages 91-99.
    3. Ramsey, David M., 2012. "Partnership formation based on multiple traits," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 216(3), pages 624-637.
    4. Vladimir V. Mazalov & Anna A. Ivashko & Elena N. Konovalchikova, 2016. "Optimal Strategies in Best-Choice Game with Incomplete Information — The Voice Show," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 18(02), pages 1-18, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Best-choice problem; mutual choice; multistage game; optimal strategy; Nash equilibrium; Subject Classification: 91A60; Subject Classification: 60G40; Subject Classification: 91A20;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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