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Constitutional Constraints Under Ambiguity: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Author

Listed:
  • MARCELLO BASILI

    (DEPFTD, University of Siena, Italy)

  • FULVIO FONTINI

    (Department of Economics, University of Padua, Italy)

Abstract

In the paper a game between private and public individuals is set in order to study under which conditions the former would like to limitex-antethe choices of the latter. Ambiguity, as distinguished from risk, is explicitly introduced by means of capacities and Choquet Expected Utility. It is shown that constitutional constraints are necessary to prevent private individuals from being exploited by public individuals whenever citizens feel a too high level of ambiguity.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcello Basili & Fulvio Fontini, 2007. "Constitutional Constraints Under Ambiguity: A Game-Theoretic Approach," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 9(01), pages 59-66.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:01:n:s0219198907001278
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198907001278
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2009. "Ambiguity and social interaction," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 355-379, April.
    2. Jean-François Laslier, 2006. "Ambiguity in Electoral Competition," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 195-210, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Games with ambiguity; Constitutional constraints; exploitation; choquet expected utility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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