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A Secure Reversion Protocol That Generates Pay-Offs Dominating Rewards From Correlated Equilibrium

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  • CEDRIC WANKO

    (LAMETA University Montpellier 1, UFR des Sciences Economiques, Avenue de la Mer CS 79606, Montpellier 34960 Cedex 2, France)

Abstract

We define the reversion protocol of a voluntarily implementable Bayesian mechanism in which risk-averse players have no incentive to cheat or to deviate from the mediator's recommendation and that can greatly improve their equilibrium expected pay-offs as compared to those generated through coordination applied to the results of an unsatisfactory mediation.

Suggested Citation

  • Cedric Wanko, 2011. "A Secure Reversion Protocol That Generates Pay-Offs Dominating Rewards From Correlated Equilibrium," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 14(06), pages 887-904.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:14:y:2011:i:06:n:s021952591100344x
    DOI: 10.1142/S021952591100344X
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. GOSSNER, Olivier, 1998. "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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    Cited by:

    1. Cédric Wanko, 2018. "A Unique and Stable $$\hbox {Se}{\mathcal {C}}\hbox {ure}$$ Se C ure Reversion Protocol Improving Efficiency: A Computational Bayesian Approach for Empirical Analysis," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 52(1), pages 1-23, June.

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