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Governors and electoral hazard in the allocation of federal disaster aid

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  • Thomas Husted
  • David Nickerson

Abstract

U.S. public disaster aid provide elected officials opportunities to engage in “electoral hazard,” where an incumbent can influence the probability of re‐election by allocating aid to influence voters' expectations of their future welfare. This is the first test for electoral hazard in the allocation of federal aid to counties exposed to the risk of economic loss from disasters by incumbent state governors running for re‐election. Using a unique county‐level data set, we estimate the determinants of the equilibrium allocation strategy of an incumbent in the presence of electoral hazard. Controlling for loss and the demographic, economic and political characteristics of at‐risk counties, we find the average incumbent governor seeking re‐election actively engages in the manipulation of voter expectations by allocating greater shares and magnitudes of the largest federal disaster aid program to those at‐risk counties that awarded the incumbent governor a plurality of votes in the preceding election.

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  • Thomas Husted & David Nickerson, 2022. "Governors and electoral hazard in the allocation of federal disaster aid," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 89(2), pages 522-539, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:89:y:2022:i:2:p:522-539
    DOI: 10.1002/soej.12603
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