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In Honor of Vernon Smith's 90th Birthday

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  • Elizabeth Hoffman

Abstract

If you have read Vernon's autobiography, you know that Vernon has very definite work hab- 4 its and does not like to be interrupted when he is totally focused on a project. What you do not get from his autobiography is his intense intellectual curiosity and his ability to see the next important 6 research project and move quickly to start something new. It is a characteristic that has annoyed some coauthors who wanted him to keep working on what was interesting to them, but which I found profoundly exciting and stimulating.
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  • Elizabeth Hoffman, 2017. "In Honor of Vernon Smith's 90th Birthday," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 83(3), pages 658-660, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:83:y:2017:i:3:p:658-660
    DOI: 10.1002/soej.12194
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hoffman Elizabeth & McCabe Kevin & Shachat Keith & Smith Vernon, 1994. "Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 346-380, November.
    2. Hoffman, Elizabeth & McCabe, Kevin A & Smith, Vernon L, 1996. "On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(3), pages 289-301.
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