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Free Cash Flow and Takeover Threats: An Experimental Study

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  • Ryan Oprea

Abstract

A classic theory of corporate governance holds that when cash flow is high and investment opportunities scarce, takeover threats reduce managerial self‐dealing and encourage dividend payment to owners. I conduct laboratory experiments studying the effect of cash flow on self‐dealing and the effect of takeover threats on both agency problems and the optimality of management of cash flows. I find that higher cash flow firms suffer more severe agency problems. Moreover I find that takeover threats reduce these problems in high cash flow firms but not low cash firms. Finally, I find evidence that takeover threats cause managers in low cash flow firms to make myopic withdraws to signal generosity.

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  • Ryan Oprea, 2008. "Free Cash Flow and Takeover Threats: An Experimental Study," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(2), pages 351-366, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:75:y:2008:i:2:p:351-366
    DOI: 10.1002/j.2325-8012.2008.tb00908.x
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