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Multimarket Equilibrium, Trade, and the Law of One Price

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  • Susan K. Laury
  • Charles A. Holt

Abstract

This paper describes the setup of two classroom markets, one with a thin supply side and relatively higher prices. A comparison of the equilibrium price tendencies in the two markets helps students discover how to apply supply and demand analysis in this context. The introduction of speculators, who buy in one market and sell in the other, reduces or eliminates the price disparity. Class discussion can be focused on how “nonproductive” speculation can increase surplus measures of efficiency when price is permitted to convey the correct information about opportunity cost. Use: This experiment can be used in classes in the principles of economics, intermediate economics, or international trade to illustrate supply and demand analysis and the effects of inter‐market trade. In upper‐level classes, optimal bidding can be addressed as well. Time: Reading instructions and completing five trading rounds takes 30 to 40 minutes. Discussion lasts an additional 15 minutes. Materials: One deck of cards for up to 36 students, one copy of the instructions, and eight small blank slips of paper for each student.

Suggested Citation

  • Susan K. Laury & Charles A. Holt, 1999. "Multimarket Equilibrium, Trade, and the Law of One Price," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(3), pages 611-621, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:65:y:1999:i:3:p:611-621
    DOI: 10.1002/j.2325-8012.1999.tb00181.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ross M. Miller & Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith, 1977. "Intertemporal Competitive Equilibrium: An Empirical Study of Speculation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 91(4), pages 599-624.
    2. Williams, Arlington W & Smith, Vernon L, 1984. "Cyclical Double-Auction Markets with and without Speculators," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57(1), pages 1-33, January.
    3. Charles A. Holt, 1996. "Classroom Games: Trading in a Pit Market," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 193-203, Winter.
    4. Plott, Charles R., 1989. "An updated review of industrial organization: Applications of experimental methods," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 19, pages 1109-1176, Elsevier.
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